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THE  INVESTMENT  BOOM THAT  PERSISTED  throughout the late nineteen- 
sixties is now over. Whether private spending for fixed capital, after allow- 
ance for rising prices, will increase at all in 1971 is an open question at 
this point. This paper attempts to supply an answer and to look a bit further 
ahead, into 1972 and early 1973. 
In order to do this, a variety of different models is presented and pro- 
jected into the future. This is necessary because to date no consensus has de- 
veloped  among economists  about the determinants of  investment (here 
taken as private expenditures on nonresidential fixed capital-plant  and 
equipment) or about the magnitude and timing of the effects of mone- 
tary and fiscal policies on this aggregate. As Arthur Okun has pointed out: 
The best example  I can offer [of a purely  scientific,  nonideological  controversy 
among economists]  is the disagreement  among  students  of business  investment 
regarding  the relative importance  of internal cash flow, the cost of external 
capital, and the growth  of final demand  as determining  factors.' 
This paper also extends the preliminary attempt to explain the behavior of 
investment spending in 1969-70 that I reported on a year ago.2 
Many models of investment behavior have been advanced, but only a few 
1. Arthur M. Okun, The Political Economy of Prosperity  (Brookings Institution, 
1970), p. 19. 
2. Charles  W. Bischoff,  "Plant  and Equipment  Spending  in 1969  and 1970,"  Brook- 
ings  Papers  on Economic  Activity  (1:1970), pp. 127-33. 
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researchers  have  attempted  to compare  them  systematically.3  The work  re- 
ported  here  is confined  to a very  high  degree  of aggregation,  which  severely 
limits the possibility  of sharp  discrimination  between  models.  I can hope 
only to highlight  the range  of disagreement  and perhaps  more  important, 
to suggest  the extent  to which  it leads  to different  policy  prescriptions.  This 
paper  presents  empirical  characterizations  of a number  of points of view 
and  reports  (a) how  well  they  explain  the investment  experience  of the post- 
Korean  era, with particular  emphasis  on 1969  and 1970;  (b) the extent  to 
which  the models  differ  with  respect  to the way  monetary  and  fiscal  policies 
affect  investment,  and  the extent  to which  these  differences  are  essential  and 
economically  important;  and  (c) what  the models  have  to say about  capital 
spending  prospects  over  the next two or three  years,  given  several  alterna- 
tive scenarios  for the path of the economy  as a whole. 
The Models 
Five different  sets of equations  explaining  investment  behavior  are pre- 
sented  and  applied  in this  paper.  This  selection  is representative  of five  theo- 
retical  positions  on the demand  for fixed  capital  goods.  In each  case  I have 
separated  investment  in equipment  from  investment  in nonresidential  struc- 
tures,  primarily  because  the tax policies  applied  to these  two types  of asset 
have diverged  greatly  in the past few years.  Other  factors  differentially  af- 
fecting  plant  spending  and equipment  spending,  such  as the price  deflators 
for the respective  aggregates,  have also moved  very  differently.4  Except  in 
one case,  however,  the form  of the equation  is the same  for both plant  and 
equipment. 
3. Prominent  studies involving systematic  comparisons  include Dale W. Jorgenson, 
Jerald  Hunter,  and M. Ishag  Nadiri, "A Comparison  of Alternative  Econometric  Models 
of Quarterly  Investment  Behavior,"  Econometrica,  Vol. 38 (March 1970), pp. 187-212; 
Jorgenson  and Calvin  D. Siebert,  "A Comparison  of Alternative  Theories  of Corporate 
Investment  Behavior,"  American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 58 (September  1968),  pp, 681- 
712; and Edwin Kuh, Capital  Stock Growth:  A Micro-econometric  Approach  (Amster- 
dam: North-Holland, 1963). 
4. The price deflators  for any given quarter  are taken as predetermined,  implying 
that, at least  for the current  period  and for the range  of demands  likely  to be encountered, 
supply is infinitely  elastic at the given price. With this proviso, all of the equations  can 
be treated as proper demand equations. In the simulations  of the future, these prices 
are based on price forecasts from a complete econometric  model, in which the prices 
depend  primarily  on unit labor costs or wages  and on price  indexes  for the economy as a 
whole, but also partially  on the share of investment  in total output, with a distributed 
lag starting  two quarters  back. Charles  W.  Bischoff  15 
For three  of the equations,  two from  one model  and  one from  another,  I 
present  an alternative  version,  which  incorporates  capital  gains,  a factor  not 
included  in the standard  equations.  The three additional  equations  bring 
the total to thirteen.  Although  I mention  various  economists  in discussing 
the rationale  behind  each of the equations,  I must  emphasize  that the pre- 
cise formal  specification  of the equations  is solely  my responsibility. 
THE  GENERALIZED  ACCELERATOR  MODEL 
The most venerable  model,  with antecedents  going  back  at least  to J. M. 
Clark,5  is based  generally  on the acceleration  principle,  which  postulates  a 
linear  relationship  between  net  investment  and  changes  in output.  As modi- 
fied  and  generalized  by, among  others,  Chenery,  Koyck,  Eisner,  and  Hick- 
man, the model has developed  as a general  distributed  lag relationship 
involving  both changes  in and level of output,  along  with the level of the 
existing  capacity  or capital stock.6  In one of a number  of formulations 
falling  within  this  class,  a firm  forms  expectations  about  its future  output  on 
the basis  of the past  output  (or sales)  of the  firm  itself,  the industry  to which 
it belongs,  or both. It then makes  plans  to adjust  its capital  stock  toward 
the level that would  be an optimum  for producing  the planned  output,  if 
this output  were  to represent  a long-run  equilibrium.  If the adjustment  in 
any given  period  is not complete,  this can be rationalized  in terms  of the 
additional  costs that the firm  would incur  if it tried  to make a very  rapid 
adjustment,  and  in terms of uncertainty  that future  demand  will prove  to 
justify  the plans.7 
5. J. Maurice  Clark, "Business  Acceleration  and the Law of Demand: A Technical 
Factor in Economic Cycles,"  Journal  of Political Economy,  Vol. 25 (March 1917), pp. 
217-35. The antecedents  go back even earlier.  See C. F. Bickerdike,  "A Non-Monetary 
Cause of Fluctuations  in Employment,"  Economic  Journal,  Vol. 24 (September  1914), 
pp. 357-70. 
6. Hollis B. Chenery,  "Overcapacity  and the Acceleration  Principle,"  Econometrica, 
Vol. 20 (January  1952),  pp. 1-28; L. M. Koyck, Distributed  Lags  and  Investment  Analysis 
(Amsterdam:  North-Holland,  1954);  Eisner's  work on this subject,  going back to 1952,  is 
extended  and summarized  in Robert Eisner,  "A Permanent  Income Theory for Invest- 
ment: Some Empirical  Explorations,"  American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 57 (June 1967), 
pp.  363-90;  Bert G. Hickman,  IMvestment  Demand and U.S. Economic Growthl  (Brook- 
ings Institution,  1965). 
7. The formal  consideration  of these  adjustment  costs, as well as the costs of adjusting 
other factors of production,  leads to extremely  complicated  theoretical  formulations, 
and to equations  that look quite different  from the one I am presenting.  The addition 
of the problem  of uncertainty  makes  the theoretical  formulations  still more formidable. 
All of the equations  in this paper are intended to approximate  models of investment 
behavior  that have  actually  been applied,  and thus I have not considered  the theoretically 16  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1971 
The idea of a partial  adjustment  process  is common  to all of the models 
presented,  and will not be repeated  as each model is introduced.  The dis- 
tinguishing  feature  of the accelerator  model  is that  the determination  of the 
planned  capital  stock is based only on output,  and not on such  factors  as 
the cost of capital,  the price of investment  goods relative  to wages, and 
various  features  of the tax system.  This pure dependence  on output  may 
result  from  technological  rigidities  that  permit  only  one  capital-output  ratio 
for each  product.  On the other  hand,  the model  may perform  well relative 
to other  models,  not because  of such  technological  rigidities,  but because 
the other  models  are  deficient  in specifying  the precise  way in which  other 
factors  determine  the optimum  capital-output  ratio. 
The model  is completed  by the assumption  that replacement  investment 
is proportional  to existing  capital  stock, or planned  output,  or some func- 
tion of the two. The demands  of the individual  firms  are  summed  to obtain 
demand  at the industry  or economy-wide  level. Differences  in the capital- 
output ratio among firms or industries  will introduce  the possibility  of 
aggregation  error. 
Although  few economists  would  consider  them  complete  representations 
of the investment  process,  models of this sort have been tested against  a 
greater  variety  of data than have any of the others  under  discussion,  and 
they have generally  performed  well. Many  forecasters  use this model as at 
least  one  element  in their  predictive  equations,  but  they  usually  modify  it by 
adding  other  variables,  including  interest  rates, cash flows, and variables 
designed  to incorporate  the effects  of tax policies. 
The mathematical  statement  of the generalized  accelerator  model  that I 
shall use is shown  as equations  (1) and (2) in Table 1. 
THE  CASH  FLOW  MODEL 
A variety  of theoretical  considerations  have  been  presented  for focusing 
on profits  or cash flow as a determinant  of business  investment.  Current 
and  past  profits  may  be thought  of as a good proxy  for future  profit  expec- 
tations, which in turn determine  investment.8  Given the changes  in tax 
superior  but practically  cumbersome  models currently  under development.  The most 
cogent discussion  of the importance,  as well as the difficulty,  of theoretical  research  in 
this area is in Marc Nerlove, "On Lags in Economic Behavior"  (the Second Henry 
Schultz  Memorial  Lecture,  presented  to the Second  World  Congress  of the Econometric 
Society, Cambridge,  England,  September  8-14, 1970; processed). 
8. See, for example,  the development  of such an equation  in Model I of Lawrence  R. 
Klein, Economic  Fluctuations  in the United  States, 1921-1941 (Wiley, 1950). Charles  W.  Bischoff  17 
Table  1. Investment  Equations  of Five  Econometric  Models 
Generalized  Accelerator  Model 
n 
(1)  IE,t  =  bo +  E  biQt-l  +  bn+lKE,t-1 +  Ut. 
i=1 
(2) Substitute  S for E in the two places  it appears  in equation  (1). 
Cash  Flow  Model 
n 
(3)  IEt  =  bo +  E  bj(F/q.)t-j  +  bn+lKE,e-  +  Ut 
(4) Substitute  S for E in the three  places  it appears  in equation  (3). 
Securities  Value  Model 
(5)  IE,t  [bo +  E  bi(V/qK)t-]  KE,t-  +  Ut. 
(6) Substitute  S for E in the two places  it appears  in equation  (5). 
Standard  Neoclassical  Model 
n 
(7)  IE.t =  bo +  E  bi(pQ/cE)I-i +  bn+lKE,tK +  U,. 
(8) Substitute  S for E in the three  places  it appears  in equation  (7). 
Federal  Reserve-MIT-Penn  Model 
n 
(9)  'E,t  =  bo +  E  j(p1c.)t-i_lQt-i 
i=l  n 
+  E  b2JiP1C.E)t-i-1  Qt-i-l  +  bn+,KEa- 
(10) I  =  bo  +  E  bi[(p/cs)0  5Qt-] +  bn+lKS,t-1 +  Ut. 
i=1 
Alternates 
(11) Substitute  alternate  formulation  of c into equation  (7). 
(12) Substitute  alternate  formulation  of c into equation  (8). 
(13) Substitute  alternate  formulation  of c into equation  (10). 
Definition  of Symbols 
b =  all coefficients 
c = rental  price  of capital,  defined,  for equipment,  as 
qE(dE +  r)(I  kE -  WZE)/(1  -  W). 
For equation  (9), the formula  for c allows for price expectations, 
according  to the following  formula: 
qE(dE +  r -/p)(l  -  kE -  wzE)/(1  -  w). 18  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1971 
Table 1 (Continued) 
For equations  (1  1)-(1  3), the alternate  formulation  allows  for capital 
gains  due  to rises  in the prices  of investment  goods;  the formula  is as 
above,  except  that  4E/qE  replaces  p3/p. 
d = rate of physical  depreciation  of capital  goods 
E = used as a subscript  to refer  to equipment 
F = sum of corporate  profits  after  taxes  plus corporate  capital consump- 
tion allowances 
= expenditures  for equipment,  constant  prices 
IS=  expenditures  for structures,  constant  prices 
i =  subscript indicating time 
K =  net capital  stock 
k =  effective rate of tax credit 
n =  number of periods 
p =  output price deflator 
Q = gross  value  added  of the private  business  sector 
q =  investment price deflator 
r = rate of discount  used  to value  return  from  future  capital  services 
S = used as a subscript  to refer  to structures 
t =  subscript indicating time 
u = serially  correlated  disturbance  representing  effect of other, omitted 
factors  influencing  investment 
V = market  value of equities  plus corporate  bonds 
w =  corporate income tax rate 
z = discounted  value of allowable  depreciation  deductions  on a dollar's 
worth  of new investment  (including,  where  appropriate,  the require- 
ment  that tax credits  be subtracted  from  the depreciation  base) 
Notes on Statistical Estimation 
In all equations,  the parameter  n is determined  by experimentation. 
With the exception  of equation  (9), all equations  are  estimated  with the 
Almon polynomial  distributed  lag technique,  using a third-degree  poly- 
nomial  with no restrictions.  For equation  (9), however,  the weights  have 
been restricted  to taper off to zero in period  t -  n -  1. 
The disturbances,  ut, from these equations  are assumed  to be generated 
by a first-order  autoregressive  process,  and the following  techniques  are 
used  in making  the estimates  reported  in Table  2. Consider  an equation  of 
the general  form, 
n 
Yt=  bo +  ,  ii  +  Ut. 
i=1 Charles  W.  Bischoff  19 
Table 1 (Continued) 
Formally,  the assumption  of a first-order  autoregressive  process  implies 
that 
Ut =  pUt-i  +  et, 
where  p is a number  between  +1  and -1.  If each of the variables,  et, is 
normally  and  identically  distributed  with  zero  mean  and  constant  variance, 
independent  of all the X variables,  and without  serial  correlation,  and if 
Yi is considered  nonstochastic,  the technique  is justified.  Consistent  and 
asymptotically  efficient  estimates  of p and of the coefficients  bo,  bl, . . .,  bn, 
may be obtained  by minimizing  the sum of squared  residuals  in the equa- 
tion 
n 
Yt-  pYt-  =  bo(I -  p) +  -(Xit -pXi,t-1)  +  et. 
This is conveniently  done by trying  a variety  of values  of p between  -1 
and + 1, forming  the "generalized  differences"  of all the variables  for each 
trial  value,  and  then using  ordinary  least squares  estimation  methods. 
The values of the Durbin-Watson  (DW) statistic  reported  in Table 2 
refer  to the residuals  from  the transformed  equations,  et; if this statistic  is 
very  far  from  2.0 it is reasonable  to conclude  that  the assumption  of a first- 
order  autoregressive  process  in the original  errors  is too simple.  The next 
alternative  might  be to assume  a second-order  process.  It should  be noted, 
however,  that with equations  like the ones in this paper,  all of which  have 
lagged  endogenous  variables  on the right-hand  side, even a value of the 
DW statistic  close to 2.0 does not necessarily  indicate  that the transforma- 
tion has removed  all of the serial  correlation. 
treatment  of depreciation,  profits  plus depreciation  might  provide  a better 
measure.  Other  theories  have  emphasized  cash  flow  (profits  after  taxes  plus 
depreciation)  as a source  of funds,  arguing  that, in the presence  of risk  and 
imperfect  capital  markets,  the cost of funds  to the firm  rises  sharply  when 
internal  funds  are  exhausted.9  As with output,  profits  or cash  flow may  be 
introduced  as one of several  elements,  but even equations  based on cash 
flow alone have been found useful  for forecasting  investment  a few quar- 
ters ahead. 
The specific  formulation  I will test is based on cash flow gross of divi- 
dends.  Whereas  most of the other models under  discussion  are basically 
9. This view is developed  in James S. Duesenberry,  Buisiness Cycles and Economic 
Growth (McGraw-Hill,  1958).  Duesenberry  stresses  cash flow net of dividends  (retained 
earnings  plus depreciation)  as a source of funds. This is one of several  important  ele- 
ments in the theoretical  model he develops. 20  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1971 
theories  of real (price-deflated)  investment,  the cash flow model is most 
naturally  stated  in terms  of current  dollars.  In order  to be able  to compare 
this model  with the others,  which  predict  investment  in constant  dollars,  I 
have  divided  cash  flow  by the  price  index  for  the  investment  aggregate  being 
explained.  The  mathematical  form  of the equation  is given  as equations  (3) 
and (4) in Table 1. 
THE  SECURITIES  VALUE  MODEL 
Several  theories  focus on the market  value  of a firm  as a determinant  of 
its investment.  James  Tobin  has argued  that if managers  seek  to maximize 
the market  value of their  corporations,  they will add to their  fixed  capital 
goods whenever  the marginal  addition  to the firm's  market  value exceeds 
the cost of the goods.10  There  are  several  difficulties  in applying  such  a the- 
ory. First, no information  is available  on the marginal  effects  on market 
valuation  of increased  spending  for capital  goods. Instead,  one can try to 
measure  the average  ratio  of the market  value  of existing  physical  capital- 
as determined  in the stock  and  bond  markets-to its reproduction  cost, and 
hope  that  the marginal  and  average  ratios  generally  move  together.  Second, 
it is difficult  to sort  out the  market  valuation  of physical  capital  from  that  of 
the rest  of a firm's  assets. 
In a crude  empirical  approximation  to this  theory,  I have  simply  used  the 
ratio of the market  value of all existing  corporations  to the net stock of 
plant and equipment  of the private  sector  (valued  at current  reproduction 
prices).  Since  this ratio is a scale-free  number,  I have multiplied  it by the 
stock of the asset  in question  at the end of the previous  period.  Inclusion 
of this stock also allows  for replacement.  This model  is similar  to one de- 
veloped  by Yehuda  Grunfeld,11  though  his rationale,  which  emphasizes  the 
role of firm  market  value  as a measure  of expected  future  profits,  is some- 
10. One place where this theory is summarized  is William C. Brainard  and James 
Tobin, "Pitfalls  in Financial  Model Building,"  American  Economic  Association,  Papers 
andProceedings  of the Eightieth  Annual  Meeting,  1967  (American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 
58, May 1968),  pp. 99-122. The guiding  principle  of the securities  value  model  is stated  on 
pp. 103-04: "One of the basic theoretical  propositions  motivating  the model is that the 
market  valuation  of equities,  relative  to the replacement  cost of the physical  assets  they 
represent,  is the major  determinant  of new investment.  Investment  is stimulated  when 
capital  is valued more highly  in the market  than it costs to produce  it, and discouraged 
when its valuation  is less than its replacement  cost." 
11. Yehuda Grunfeld,  "The Determinants  of Corporate  Investment,"  in Arnold C. 
Harberger  (ed.), The  Demand  for Durable  Goods  (University  of Chicago  Press,  1960),  pp. 
211-66. Charles  W.  Bischoff  21 
what  different.  The  model  is stated  mathematically  in equations  (5) and  (6) 
of Table 1. 
THE  STANDARD  NEOCLASSICAL  MODEL 
Dale Jorgenson,  in a large  body of work  with  various  colleagues,  has de- 
veloped  and applied  several  closely  related  models  of investment  behavior 
based  on his version  of the neoclassical  theory  of optimal  capital  accumula- 
tion.12  The term derives  from the focus on the classical  economic  theory 
emphasizing  the relative  prices  of factors  of production  as a determinant  of 
optimal  factor proportions.  Several  of the other theories  represented  by 
models  discussed  in this paper  could  just as well  be called  neoclassical,  but 
Jorgenson's  particular  version  has  been  applied  in so many  cases  that  it has 
become  the standard  against  which  all of the others  are  measured. 
In the  Jorgenson  model,  as in the accelerator  model,  each  firm  is assumed 
to be adjusting  towards  a "desired"  stock  of capital.  In contrast  with  the ac- 
celerator  model,  the neoclassical  model assumes  that the desired  stock de- 
pends  not only on planned  output  but also on the ratio of output  price  to 
the implicit  rental  price  of the services  of capital  goods.  Jorgenson  also as- 
sumes  that the production  possibilities  facing  each  firm  are governed  by a 
Cobb-Douglas  production  function.  Given  this and several  additional  as- 
sumptions,  the "desired"  capital  stock  K*  may  be shown  to equal  (apQ)/c, 
where  p is the price  deflator  for output,  c is the rental  price  of the services 
of capital  goods, and a is the elasticity  of capital  stock in the production 
function. 
The  formula  for c, shown  in Table  1, and  the particular  empirical  specifi- 
cation  I use of the statistical  series  that go into calculation  of c are derived 
from  Jorgenson's  work  with  Robert  E. Hall.13 
The  basic  equations  for  the standard  neoclassical  (SNC)  model  are  shown 
12. The theory  underlying  this model is stated most fully in Dale W. Jorgenson,  "The 
Theory of Investment  Behavior,"  in Robert Ferber (ed.), Determinants  of Investment 
Behavior,  A Conference  of the Universities-National  Bureau  Committee  for Economic 
Research  (Columbia  University  Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research, 
1967). Jorgenson's  voluminous empirical  work with this model begins with "Capital 
Theory  and Investment  Behavior,"  American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 53 (May 1963),  pp. 
247-59. 
13. Robert E. Hall and Dale W. Jorgenson,  "Tax Policy and Investment  Behavior," 
American  Economic  Review, Vol. 57 (June 1967), pp. 391-414. Hall and Jorgenson, 
"Application  of the Theory  of Optimum  Capital  Accumulation,"  in Gary Fromm  (ed.), 
Tax Incentives  and Capital  Spending  (Brookings  Institution, 1971). 22  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1971 
as equations  (7) and  (8) in Table  1. Equations  (11) and  (12) reflect  an alter- 
native  formulation,  which  has  been applied  by Jorgenson  and Siebert,  that 
takes into account  capital gains due to rises in the price of investment 
goods.14  In a period  of rapid  inflation,  especially  for construction,  expected 
price  change  is likely  to be important;  the amount  of building  undertaken 
now because  it will be more  expensive  later  is likely  to be significant.  There 
are, however,  difficulties  in representing  empirically  the rate of change  in 
prices  of investment  goods,  since  it is the expected  rate  of price  change  that 
is relevant.15 
THE  FMP  MODEL 
A somewhat  different  version  of the neoclassical  model is used in the 
Federal  Reserve-MIT-Pennsylvania  econometric  model  (hereafter  referred 
to as the FMP model.)16  The original  investment  functions  for this model 
were  my own  work  (with  a large  assist  from  Franco  Modigliani  and  Albert 
Ando).  Ando, Modigliani,  Robert  Rasche,  and  Stephen  J. Turnovsky  have 
subsequently  derived  a more  general  theory  for the equipment  equation.17 
The  equations  used  here  are  a slightly  simplified  version  of those  used  in the 
model;  the  principal  difference  is that  here  I predict  equipment  expenditures 
directly  in a single  relationship  instead  of first  predicting  equipment  orders 
and  then  predicting  expenditures  on the basis  of orders,  as the model  does. 
In contrast  to the other  models presented  here, the FMP model treats 
equipment  and  construction  asymmetrically.  Instead  of adjusting  toward  a 
desired  stock of equipment,  firms  are assumed  to adjust  toward  a desired 
level of productive  capacity,  and  they  respond  to a change  in output  prices 
14. Dale W. Jorgenson  and Calvin D. Siebert,  "Optimal  Capital Accumulation  and 
Corporate Investment  Behavior,"  Journal  of Political Economy,  Vol. 76 (November/ 
December  1968),  pp. 1123-51. 
15. Following Jorgenson  and Siebert,  I have used (qt -qt-4)/[0.5(qt  +  qt-4)], but a 
number of other formulations  are at least as plausible.  I have, however,  retained the 
Hall and Jorgenson  treatment  of depreciation  for tax purposes,  which is theoretically 
preferable  to that of Jorgenson  and Siebert. 
16. No single reference  to the complete, final version of this model yet exists. The 
fullest discussion of the investment sector is contained in Albert Ando and Franco 
Modigliani, "Econometric  Analysis of  Stabilization Policies," American Economic 
Association,  Papers and  Proceedings  of the Eighty-first  Annual  Meeting,  1968 (American 
Economic  Review,  Vol. 59, May 1969),  pp. 296-314. For the theoretical  derivation  of the 
equipment  equation see Charles  W. Bischoff, "The Effect of Alternative  Lag Distribu- 
tions," in Fromm (ed.), Tax Incentives  and Capital  Spending. 
17. See their  paper,  "On  the Role of Expectations  of Price  Changes  and  Technological 
Change in an Investment  Function"  (March 1971; processed). Charles  W. Bischoff  23 
relative  to the rental  price  of capital  by changing  the capital  intensity  not of 
the entire  stock  but only of new  net or replacement  capacity  put into place. 
This model is derived  from an assumption  about  technology:  Factor  pro- 
portions  are  assumed  to be variable  only up to the point  that new capacity 
is put into place.18 
The conceptual  form  of the equation  is: 
I =  (p/c)*[Q  -  (1 -d)Q-l]t* 
where  (p/c)* represents  planned  capital intensity,  (Q -  Q1)*  represents 
planned  net additions  to capacity,  and (dQ_1)*  represents  replacement. 
The statistical  specification  of this relationship,  shown in equation  (9) of 
Table 1, incorporates  two separate  lag distributions,  which allow the dy- 
namic  impact  of changes  in the relative  prices,  interest  rates,  and tax pol- 
icies  captured  in thep/c term  to vary  substantially  from  the dynamic  impact 
of the output  terms.  Essentially,  the impact  of output  here  is similar  to that 
in the accelerator  model:  A rise  in output  sets off a temporary  boom in in- 
vestment  which then tapers off. No such temporary  boom occurs  in re- 
sponse  to a change  in any of the variables  captured  in the  p/c  term. 
This  model  also  differs  from  the Hall-Jorgenson  model  in its treatment  of 
the variables  determining  c, the rental  price  of capital  services.  The formula 
for c is the same  as that  in equations  (7) and  (8), but r, the cost of capital,  is 
taken  to be a function  of the corporate  bond  yield,  the dividend-price  ratio, 
and  the expected  rate  of change  of output  prices.19  The  weights  in this  func- 
tion are  derived  approximately  from  previous  estimation  of this  equation.20 
The equation  for nonresidential  construction  is much closer  to the one 
used in the standard  neoclassical  model. Apart  from the method  of com- 
puting  the cost of capital,  the only difference  is that the price  elasticity  of 
demand  for structures  is set at 0.5 instead  of unity.21  The structures  equa- 
tion is (10) in Table 1. 
18. A simplified  example  of the theoretical  differences  between  the accelerator,  stan- 
dard neoclassical,  and FMP equipment  equations  is found in Appendix  A. 
19. The theoretical  development  of this formula is discussed  in Ando, Modigliani, 
Rasche, and Turnovsky,  "On the Role of Expectations." 
20. See Appendix  B for details on the formulation.  In judging  the explanatory  power 
of the equation  both during  and beyond the sample  period,  this earlier  nonlinear  estima- 
tion must be taken into account. 
21. As for the equipment equation, the weights underlying  r and also the price 
elasticity  represent  previous  nonlinear  estimates.  Tests of a model similar  to the equip- 
ment equation did not prove successful; the implication is that structures  are more 
flexible  than equipment,  and that capital intensity  can be varied both before and after 
structures  are put into place. 24  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1971 
As in the case  of the standard  neoclassical  equations,  the  consideration  of 
capital  gains  leads  to an alternative  formula  for the rental  price  of capital 
services.  This provides  an alternative  FMP equation  for structures,  shown 
as equation  (13) in Table 1. I have used the same formula  for the rate of 
change  of the investment  price  deflator  described  in footnote 15. 
Performance  and  Implications  of the Models 
The parameters  of the five models  have been estimated  using quarterly 
data,  seasonally  adjusted  at annual  rates,  with a sample  period  encompass- 
ing the sixty-four  quarters  from 1953  through  1968.  For the thirteen  equa- 
tions, summary  statistics  are provided  in Table  2. Because  the residuals- 
differences  between  actual  and  predicted  values-of successive  quarters  are 
strongly  correlated  with one another,  a special  estimation  technique  has 
been  used  (see Table  1). 
As indicated  in the rho column  of Table 2, nearly  all of the equations 
show  high  positive  serial  correlation  of the residuals  for successive  quarters. 
Thus, with the possible  exception  of the FMP equipment  equation,22  the 
excellent  fits have been achieved  very largely  by feeding  the last period's 
error  back  into the equation. 
In the most  extreme  case,  the equipment  equation  for the securities  value 
model has been estimated  using first differences  of all the variables.  Of 
course,  this kind  of estimation  is not new or unusual,  but projections  using 
a first-difference  equation  require  knowledge  of the level of the variable  in 
the previous  period.  If the actual  value  for  that  period  is not known,  then  an 
estimated  value  must be used. This means  that the total error  for an esti- 
mate  over  two periods  will consist  of the sum  of the error  in the first  period 
plus the error  in the estimated  change  for the second  period. 
This  accumulation  of errors  will  not be serious  if the  errors  of consecutive 
periods  tend to cancel each other out. On the average,  the sum of dis- 
turbances  e should  approximate  zero  (see note to Table  1). But the further 
the projection  is carried  beyond  the last observed  value of the dependent 
variable,  the  larger  the  variance  of the  sum  of consecutive  errors  will  become. 
22. In this case, the lack of apparent  serial correlation  in the (estimated)  residuals 
does not disprove  the assumption  of considerable  serial  correlation  in the (true but un- 
observed)  errors.  Instead,  I believe  it may reflect  the substantial  amount  of experimenta- 
tion that went into the development  of this equation.  In other  words,  the estimate  of rho 
for equation (9) is probably  biased downwards. Charles W. Bischoff  25 
Table 2.  Summary Statistics for Five Investment  Models 
Number 
Standard  Coefficient  Durbin-  of terms 
error  of  of autocor-  Watson in Almon 
estimate  relation"  statistic  lago 
Model  K2  SEE&,b  p  DW  n 
Equipment  expenditures 
Generalized  accelerator  0.9901  957  0.706  1.86  23 
Cash flow  0.9924  841  0.585  1.71  23 
Securities  value  0.9874  1,016  1.000  1.98  13 
Standard  neoclassical  0.9893  995  0.801  1.74  13 
Standard  neoclassical 
(alternate)  0.9869  1,099  0.864  1.70  15 
Federal  Reserve-MIT- 
Penn  0.9931  800  0.251  2.06  21 
Construction  expenditures 
Generalized  accelerator  0.9611  553  0.849  2.15  23 
Cash flow  0.9664  515  0.646  2.09  23 
Securities  value  0.9630  540  0.930  2.37  13 
Standard  neoclassical  0.9613  551  0.774  2.02  23 
Standard  neoclassical 
(alternate)  0.9579  576  0.885  2.07  15 
Federal  Reserve-MIT- 
Penn  0.9733  459  0.663  2.41  17 
Federal  Reserve-MIT- 
Penn (alternate)  0.9633  537  0.814  2.21  19 
Source: Derived by author. See text for description of models. 
a.  The "corrected"  R2  and standard error of estimate are computed using more than the normal correc- 
tion factor to allow for biases due to (a) the "data mining" involved in choosing the best length of lag, n, 
and because p is estimated; (b) seasonal adjustment of the data; and (c) the fact that several parameters  used 
in deriving the FMP model-parameters  affecting the rental variable and the price elasticity of demand-are 
approximated on the basis of experience gained in previous nonlinear estimation. For these reasons, five ex- 
tra degrees of freedom were subtracted  for the generalized  accelerator, cash flow, standard neoclassical, and 
securities  value models; nine subtracted  for the FMP equipment equation; and eight for the FMP construc- 
tion equation. These bias adjustments  are at best crude approximations. SEE refers  to the square root of the 
estimated variance of e (not u) in the note to Table 1. TR2  refers to 1 -  Variance estimated for e 
Variance  estimated for Y 
b.  Millions of 1958 dollars. 
c.  See notes, Table 1. 
It might  be expected,  then,  that when  they are  projected  several  quarters 
into the future,  without  the knowledge  of errors  from  previous  quarters  to 
provide  a correction  factor,  these  equations  will  not perform  as well  as they 
did during  the sample  period.  Since  one of the goals  of this paper  is to pro- 
vide estimates  up to ten quarters  into the future,  this is not a particularly 
good omen. 26  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1971 
ANALYSIS  OF ESTIMATED PARTIAL  RESPONSE  PATTERNS 
In order  to understand  what the estimated  equations  imply about the 
responses  of investment  to each of its determinants,  I have carried  out a 
number  of experiments.  In each  experiment  one  lagged  explanatory  variable 
is changed  by a small  amount,  while all other  variables  are held constant, 
and  the response  of investment  in succeeding  quarters  is traced.  These  are 
called  partial  responses,  because  if all of the variables  were  allowed  to move 
freely, the total response  in each period might well be either larger or 
smaller.  Table  3 shows  the partial  responses  to a $1 billion  rise in output 
(and  the associated  estimated  rise  in cash  flow and  security  value)  in the ten 
basic equations,  period  by period. 
For equipment,  the short-run  response  patterns  fall into three  categories 
and so do the long-run  magnitudes.  According  to both the generalized  ac- 
celerator  and FMP equations,  a change  in output  induces  a large,  tempo- 
rary  investment  boom, as capital  (or capacity)  is adjusted  to its new  desired 
level. This temporary  peak  response  reflects  the traditional  accelerator  ef- 
fect. In both cases the peak response  comes about six quarters  after  the 
change,  and is more  than twice  the long-run  response.  Similar  accelerator 
effects  are  evident  in the generalized  accelerator,  SNC, and  FMP construc- 
tion equations;  and for construction,  the temporary  peak responses  are 
even relatively  larger,  more than three times the size of the long-run  re- 
sponse.  The peak effects  come a bit later  in the SNC and FMP equations 
(eleven  and ten quarters  after  the change,  respectively,  compared  with six 
quarters  for the generalized  accelerator  equation). 
The SNC equipment  equation  also shows an accelerator-type  response, 
but it is much  weaker  and slower  than  the response  in the FMP equipment 
equation.  The  reason  for  this, in my opinion,  is as follows:  I believe  that  the 
SNC equipment  equation  is basically  misspecified,  in so far as it assumes 
that the response  of investment  spending  to a change in relative  prices 
(wages,  interest  rates,  the investment  deflator,  tax credits,  and so on) is the 
same  as the response  to a change  in output.  This assumption  is an essential 
part  of the model  (see  Appendix  A), but  it may  be empirically  invalid.  If the 
assumption  of identical  response  patterns  is invalid,  the SNC equipment 
equation  fails  to distinguish  an explosive  response  to output  from  a gradual 
response  to relative  prices.  Thus,  when  the response  pattern  is statistically 
estimated  for a period  in which  there  is substantial  variation  in both output 
and relative  prices,  the pattern  is really  a mixture,  or average,  of two dis- rA~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~4  (U 
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tinct responses.  The estimates  would  tend  to show a smaller  and less rapid 
response  to output  than  in fact occurs,  but a larger  and  quicker  response  to 
relative  prices  than actually  takes place. 
The contrast  between  the short-run  elasticities  of equipment  spending 
with respect  to output  and  relative  prices,  when  the estimated  lag distribu- 
tions for the two effects  are allowed  to differ,  is illustrated  in Table 4. It 
compares  the short-  and  long-run  responses  for the  two types  of investment 
determinants  in the SNC and  FMP models.  As the theoretical  analysis  sug- 
gests,  the short-run  effects  of changes  in relative  prices  in the FMP equip- 
ment equation  are dramatically  smaller  than the long-run  effects.  In the 
FMP construction  equation  the responses  to relative  prices  are  exactly  half 
of the responses  to output  in the long run,  because  of my a priori  assump- 
tion that the long-run  elasticity  of construction  with respect  to p/c  is one- 
half. The key point  illustrated  by Table  4 is that  all of the estimated  elastic- 
ities for the two SNC equations  lie between  the output and relative  price 
elasticities  for the corresponding  FMP equations.  This is what would be 
expected  if the two types of effects  were  being  confounded. 
Table 4.  Estimated Short- and Long-Run Elasticities of Capital 
Expenditures  in SNC and FMP Models 
Equipment  equations  Construction  equations 
SNC  SNC 
output  or  FMP  output  or  FMP 
relative  FMP  relative  relative  FMP  relative 
Quarters  price  output  price  price  output  price 
after  elasticity  elasticity  elasticity  elasticity  elasticity  elasticity 
change  Q or p/c  Q  p/c  Q or p/c  Q  p/c 
0  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  O.000  0.000 
1  0.419  1.535  0.000  0.439  0.559  0.280 
2  0.658  1.691  0.152  0.856  1.219  0.610 
3  0.778  1.796  0.272  1.239  1.909  0.955 
4  0.832  1.855  0.367  1.591  2.567  1.284 
5  0.858  1.875  0.441  1.899  3.147  1.573 
6  0.884  1.862  0.497  2.149  3.636  1.818 
7  0.930  1.822  0.539  2.350  3.998  2.000 
8  1.000  1.761  0.569  2.505  4.238  2.119 
9  1.094  1.683  0.593  2.608  4.359  2.179 
10  1.203  1.593  0.610  2.658  4.362  2.181 
Long 
run  0.757  0.902  0.902  0.843  0.991  0.496 
Source: Author's estimates. These elasticities are calculated using  1970:3  values  of  Q and p/c,  and 
1970:3 initial conditions. Charles  W.  Bischoff  29 
The second  type of response  pattern  shown in Table 3 is the one indi- 
cated  for the cash flow equations.  Here  too the investment  response  tem- 
porarily  exceeds  its long-run  value.  The  overshooting  is relatively  moderate, 
however,  and the peaks  come relatively  late (for the equipment  equation, 
not for five  years;  for the construction  equation,  after  eleven  quarters).  As 
was mentioned  earlier,  there are several  theoretical  justifications  for a 
model of investment  based  on profit-type  variables.  If the preferred  theo- 
retical  argument  is that cash flow variables  determine  a "desired"  capital 
stock (as in the accelerator  theory),  the observed  overshooting  of invest- 
ment in response  to incremental  cash  flow can be interpreted  in the same 
way that it has been  interpreted  in the output-based  models. 
The  third  type of response  pattern  indicated  in Table  3 is the response  of 
investment  to a change in the market  value of outstanding  bonds and 
equities.  These  responses  start  out slowly  but  build  up  to a rather  high  level, 
especially  after  the first  year.  No constant  long-run  responses  can be com- 
puted  for these  equations,  since  they  have  neither  a static  equilibrium  nor a 
stable  dynamic  equilibrium  along  a path  characterized  by a constant  rate  of 
growth.  This lack of equilibrium  properties  raises  severe  doubts  about  the 
value of the equations  in any long-term  projection,  but the short-run  re- 
sults are nevertheless  of some interest.  The response  of equipment  invest- 
ment  to a change  in market  value  is still increasing  after  ten quarters  while 
the construction  response  peaks  after  nine quarters.  Because  the lag distri- 
butions  contain  large  responses  in the second  and  third  years  after  a change, 
predictions  from  this  model  show  current  investment  responding  sluggishly 
at first  and  very  powerfully  later  to a change  in market  value  of outstanding 
securities. 
In addition  to output,  a number  of fiscal  and  monetary  policy  variables 
are  included  by the SNC and  FMP equations  in the terms  representing  the 
rental  price  of capital  services.  Table  4 gives  the short-  and  long-run  partial 
response  of investment  to changes  in  p/c,  expressed  as a percentage  of the 
investment  that would otherwise  take place. The effect of any particular 
fiscal or monetary  variable  also depends  on how much  it changes  p/c.  In 
Table  5 I have  listed  the long-run  partial  elasticities  of investment  spending 
with respect  to a number  of possible  policy variables.  To determine  the 
approximate  short-run  response  of investment  to any  variable  affecting  p/c 
one need only multiply  the long-run  percentage  shown  in Table 5 by the 
ratio of the short-  and  long-run  responses  shown  in Table  4. Thus,  Table  5 
shows that, according  to equation  (9), a 10 percent  fall in the industrial 30  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1971 
Table  5. Estimated  Long-Run  Partial  Elasticities  of 
Capital  Expenditures  in SNC and  FMP Models 
Equipment  equation  Construction  equation 
Variable  SNC  FMP  SNC  FMP 
Output  0.757  0.902  0.843  0.991 
Price of output  0.757  0.902  0.843  0.496 
Price of investment  goods  -0.757  -0.902  -0.843  -0.496 
Bond yield  0.000  -0.360  0.000  0.000 
Rate of expected  price  change  0.000  0.161  0.000  0.000 
"Real"  bond yield  0.000  -0.198  0.000  0.000 
Dividend yield  0.000  -0.164  0.000  -0.346 
Corporate  tax rate  0.114  -0.392  0.138  -0.226 
Depreciation  life of asset  -0.139  -0.169  n.c.  n.c. 
Rate of tax credit  0.061  0.068  n.c.  n.c. 
Source: Author's estimates. All elasticity calculations are made using 1970:4 values of all relative prices, 
except in the case of the tax credit, for which an effective rate of 5 percent was assumed, although no credit 
was in effect at that time. Values for other monetary and fiscal variables were: bond yield 0.0822; rate of 
expected price change 0.0453; real bond yield 0.0369; dividend yield 0.0337; corporate tax rate 0.48; de- 
preciation life for equipment 13.1; depreciation life for structures  22.8. 
n.c.  Not computed. 
corporate  bond  yield  (corresponding  in 1970:4  to a drop  of 82 basis  points) 
eventually  increases  investment  in equipment  by about  3.60 percent  (since 
the elasticity  in the long run is -  0.360).  Table  4 shows  that the decline  in 
the bond yield  will produce  no increase  in expenditures  until  two quarters 
after  the change  and  then  will stimulate  equipment  spending  by about  0.61 
percent  (3.60  times  0.152  divided  by 0.902)  in the second  quarter,  1.09  per- 
cent (3.60 times  0.272 divided  by 0.902)  in the third  quarter,  and so forth. 
The eventual  increase  will be approximately  3.60 percent,  provided  the 
expected  rate  of change  of output  prices  remains  constant  so that  the entire 
decrease  shows  up as a decrease  in the "real"  interest  rate.  If the expected 
rate of change  of output  prices  declines  by a similar  amount,  there  will be 
no long-run  effect  of the decrease  in the bond yield. 
The  FMP  equations  use  market  yields  on bonds  and  equities  to determine 
the discount  rate  used  by firms  to evaluate  investment  projects.  As Table  5 
shows,  most of the elasticities  of p/c  with respect  to these yields are sub- 
stantial.23  It is true  that  these  elasticities  have  not been  directly  estimated  in 
this paper, and this raises some doubt about the validity  of the specific 
numerical  values.24 
23. The exception  is the bond yield in the structures  equation. In free estimation  its 
coefficient  ran up against  the constraint  that it could not be negative. 
24. For instances  in which the responses  have been freely estimated,  see Ando and Charles  W.  Bischoff  31 
In contrast,  however,  the discount  rate in the SNC equations  is a con- 
stant  before  taxes;  businessmen  are  assumed  to aim always  for a 20 percent 
pretax  return;  their  target  rate  of return  after  taxes  thus declines  when the 
tax rate  rises.  This  explains  the "wrong"  signs  on the corporate  tax rate  for 
both SNC equations.  The  partial  effect  of a tax rise  in lowering  the  required 
after-tax  discount  rate  swamps  all other  effects  of the tax rate on  p/c.  The 
FMP equations,  however,  show substantial  negative  partial  impacts of 
higher  profits  taxes  on investment. 
Extrapolation  of the Equations  to 1969 and  1970 
As a test of the ability  of the equations  to predict  beyond  the sample  pe- 
riod, I have extrapolated  all except the securities  value equations  eight 
quarters  beyond  the last sample  point, with no error  corrections.  In addi- 
tion, the lagged  capital  stock  variables  in each  equation  are  generated  from 
the past predictions.  The results  of this extrapolation  or "dynamic  simula- 
tion" are shown  in Table  6. 
This  test of tracking  ability  in 1969  and 1970  produces  mixed  results.  The 
root-mean-square  errors  are  generally  larger  than  the standard  errors  of es- 
timate  during  the sample.25  In view  of the serial  correlation,  as noted  above, 
this is to be expected.  The peak  in 1969:4  is correctly  projected  by three  of 
the equipment  equations,  from  the FMP, generalized  accelerator,  and SNC 
models.  The simulation  using  the FMP equipment  equation  does  extremely 
well for five  quarters,  then  moves  downward  in 1970  more  sharply  than  the 
actual  series.26  In addition  to mirroring  the downward  movement  of busi- 
ness output  after 1969:3, this movement  reflects  the delayed  effect  of the 
1969  removal  of the 7 percent  investment  tax credit  on equipment  expendi- 
others, "On the Role of Expectations,"  for equipment,  and Charles  W. Bischoff, "In- 
vestment  Behavior:  A Model of Nonresidential  Construction  in the United States,"  in 
American Economic Association, Papers and Proceedings  of the Eighty-Second  Annual 
Meeting,  1969 (American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 60, May 1970),  pp. 10-17, for construc- 
tion. 
25. The-root-mean-square  errors  are computed  on the basis of eight observations  for 
construction,  but only seven  for equipment,  because  equipment  spending  was artificially 
depressed  in 1970:4 by the automobile  strike. 
26. The good performance  is partly illusory, since Ando, Modigliani, Rasche, and 
Turnovsky,  while fitting their equations only through 1968, did examine their effects 
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tures.27  In quantitative  terms the drop in output is the most important 
determinant  of the decline  in predicted  values,  and  the generalized  accelera- 
tor equation,  which  depends  only on output  and  is the second-best  predic- 
tive equation,  also reflects  the decline. 
For construction,  the standard  neoclassical  and generalized  accelerator 
equations  provide  the best extrapolations.  The SNC equation,  except  for a 
prediction  of the 1969:3 peak that is one quarter  too early, catches  the 
movement  of the actual  series  extremely  well.  The accelerator  equation  also 
tracks  construction  quite  well in the projection  period. 
The performance  of the two cash flow equations,  in contrast  to that of 
the three  models  in which  output  plays  a major  role, is definitely  inferior. 
This is unexpected  because  these two equations  provided  the second-best 
explanation  in the sample  period  for both equipment  and structures.  Both 
of the cash flow equations  underpredict  badly throughout  1969-70. The 
lower  projections  from  these  equations  are  a result  of the fact  that  the share 
of corporate  profits  in output  has been  unusually  low recently.28  In trying 
to distinguish  between  output-based  and profit-based  investment  theories, 
researchers  in the past  have  been  plagued  by the very  close  relationship  be- 
tween profits  and sales. The profit share was exceptionally  depressed  in 
1969-70,  even  when  the decline  in output  is taken  into account.  These  years 
provide  a situation  in which  the correlation  is broken,  and in this one in- 
stance,  the results  do not seem  to support  the profit-based  model. 
To complete  the discussion  of the results  in Table  6, the three  "alternate" 
equations,  which  build  expectations  of capital  gains  into the rental  price  of 
investment  goods, must be considered.  The estimated  standard  errors  for 
these  three  equations  shown  in Table  2 are  larger  than  the standard  errors 
27. I assume  that the depressing  effect  of the tax credit  removal  essentially  started  not 
when it was announced  but only when it was passed.  In making  this assumption  I have 
heeded  the argument  of Saul Hymans,  made in response  to an earlier  draft  of this paper, 
that the tax credit parameter  cannot be set precipitately  to zero starting  in the second 
quarter  of 1969. Although the administration's  intention to seek permanent  repeal of 
the tax credit  was announced  April 21, 1969,  and the repeal  was eventually  made retro- 
active for all equipment  ordered  after April 18, it was not passed until December  1969. 
There was a large bulge in orders  in the months between  announcement  and passage, 
which affected  expenditures  into 1970. A previous  temporary  repeal had affected  only 
equipment  ordered  more  than a month  after  announcement.  By only gradually  reducing 
the credit parameter  to zero, following the lead of Hymans, I have taken account of 
business skepticism  about the passage  and effective  date of the repeal. 
28. See Arthur  M. Okun  and George L. Perry,  "Notes and Numbers on the Profits 
Squeeze,"  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity  (3:1970), pp. 466-72. 34  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1971 
for the corresponding  equations  that ignore  capital  gains.  For the dynamic 
simulations  of the 1969-70  period  shown  in Table  6, these equations  also 
produce  results  inferior  to those from their counterpart  equations.  In all 
simulations  these  three  equations  generally  overpredict  investment;  this is 
especially  noticeable  for  the alternate  SNC equipment  equation,  which  pro- 
duces  extremely  buoyant  predictions.  It is somewhat  frustrating  that these 
equations  do not seem  to perform,  because,  in theory  at least,  capital  gains 
should  not be ignored.  It is likely  that  the specification  used  is too naive  and 
does not capture  whatever  expectations  are  really  held about  the degree  to 
which expected  future  increases  in prices  make current  investment  more 
desirable. 
The securities  value  equations,  in contrast  to the others,  have  been  simu- 
lated for 1969-70  in first-differenced  form.  This is appropriate  because  the 
equipment  equation  was estimated  using  first  differences  and the construc- 
tion equation,  with  an autocorrelation  coefficient  of 0.930,  was  estimated  on 
data  that  were  very  close to being  first  differenced.  The results  are  given in 
Table  7. Both  securities  value  equations  generally  overpredict,  with  the esti- 
mated peaks coming one quarter  late. The root-mean-square  errors  and 
Table 7.  Simulation of Securities Value Equations  in 
First-Differenced  Form, 1969-70 
Billions of 1958 dollars,  seasonally  adjusted  annual  rate 
Equipment  expenditures  Construction  expenditures 
Year  and  quarter  Actual  Predicted  Actual  Predicted 
1969:1  55.4  58.7  23.8  24.8 
2  57.0  60.3  23.1  25.8 
3  57.3  61.1  24.6&  26.4 
4  57.8&  60.9  24.3  26.5a 
1970:1  56.5  61.2&  24.4  26.2 
2  56.7  61.1  23.5  25.6 
3  56.9  58.7  22.6  24.4 
4  54.5  56.0b  21.8  22.7 
Mean errore  ...  -3.5  ...  -1.8 
Root-mean-square  errord  ...  3.6  ...  1.9 
Sources: Same as Table 6. 
a.  Peak. 
b.  No  correction for the effect of the automobile strike was made. For equipment this observation was 
excluded from the calculation of mean error and root-mean-square  error, which are based only on the first 
seven observations. 
c.  Average of actual minus predicted values. 
d.  Square root of average squared errors. Charles  W.  Bischoff  35 
mean errors  (in absolute  size) exceed  those of nearly  all other equations. 
The overpredictions  reflect  the lagged  effects  of high values  of the ratio of 
market  value  to the reproduction  cost of capital  in 1968,  and  the substantial 
lag of four to five quarters  before  the 1969  downturn  of equity  values  sig- 
nificantly  influences  the  predictions.  It is of interest,  however,  that  the  errors 
come close to canceling  out over the eight quarters,  and by 1970:4 the 
simulated  values  are  closer  to the actual  values  than they are at any other 
point in the prediction  period. 
The general  conclusion  from these tests is that the three output-based 
models-FMP, SNC, and  accelerator-perform  the best,  though  no one of 
these is clearly  superior  to the other  two. 
The partial  response  patterns  discussed  earlier  provide  some clue to the 
differing  projections  for 1969  and 1970.  The decline  in equipment  spending 
during  1970  projected  by the accelerator,  SNC, and FMP equations  is ba- 
sically  a response  to the decline  of output  from  its 1969:3  peak.  The small- 
est decline  in equipment  spending  from  1969:4  to 1970:  4-$1.2  billion  (an- 
nual  rate,  1958  prices)-is projected  by the SNC  equation.  It is composed  of 
a small  and  delayed  response  to the drop  in output  and a negative  response 
to the removal  of the investment  tax credit.  The accelerator  equation  pro- 
jects a decrease  of $2.5  billion,  all due to the output  decline;  the projected 
drop in investment  is larger  than that of the SNC equation  because  the 
accelerator  equation  has larger  output multipliers  in the short run. The 
FMP equation  predicts  the largest  decline  by far-$4.5  billion-since its 
response  to output  is fully  as big as that from  the accelerator  equation,  and 
it gives  some  weight  to the removal  of the tax credit  and  the rise  in interest 
rates. 
These  three  equations  all project  declines  in construction  spending,  again 
in large  part  as a response  to the drop  in output.  The accelerator  equation 
ignores  the price  rises  for construction  and  thus projects  only a very  small 
drop.  Even  though  the FMP equation  has  a price  elasticity  of only  one-half, 
it still gives the most bearish  picture  of construction-a $4.6 billion de- 
crease  from  the 1969:  1 peak-because the yield  on equities  rose  30 percent 
between  1969:2 and 1970:2.  This influence  alone would  reduce  construc- 
tion investment  by about 15 percent  within a year. The SNC equation, 
despite  its high  price  elasticity,  produces  a projection  that is almost  on the 
nose. 
The cash  flow  equations  also project  declines  for constant-dollar  spend- 
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tion. These  declines  mirror  the fall in cash  flow  that  began  after  the 1969:2 
peak. In addition,  rapidly  rising  construction  prices  depress  the constant- 
dollar  estimates  of construction  spending  even before  cash  fow begins  to 
fall. 
The movements  projected  by the securities  value equations  reflect  first 
the rise in equity and bond values  that took place between  1967:4 and 
1969:2 and  then, with a lag, the decline  that continued  until  the trough  in 
1970:2.  The long lags reflect  the response  patterns  shown  in Table  3. 
Assumptions  underlying  Projections 
Four types  of assumptions  and adjustments  must  be specified  before  the 
equations  can  be used  to project  future  investment.  First,  the path  of over- 
all economic  activity  must  be projected.  That  projection  is not the result  of 
my own work  with a complete  econometric  model.  Instead,  I have  made  a 
number  of assumptions  about  the paths  of output,  cash  flow,  and  the value 
of securities  that seem reasonable  to me, and then extrapolated  the equa- 
tions based  on these assumptions. 
Second,  the equations  must  be adjusted  to take  account  of the temporary 
distortion  of investment  in autos  and  trucks,  and of the level of output,  in 
late 1970  because  of a strike  at General  Motors. 
Third,  on January  11, 1971,  President  Nixon announced  his intention  to 
put into effect  a new policy with regard  to depreciation  of all equipment 
purchased  after  January  1, 1971.  As of this writing,  the new  rules  have  not 
yet been  formally  promulgated,  but some assumption  must  be made  about 
the outcome  of this  proposal  and  about  changes  in cash  flow  and  the cost of 
capital  that might  result. 
Finally,  the equations  require  adjustment  to take account  of the persis- 
tence of errors  that affected  the results  in 1969  and 1970. 
GENERAL  ECONOMIC  PATH 
The standard  set of assumptions  about future  economic  activity  corre- 
sponds  approximately  to the "consensus  forecast"  for  the next  ten quarters. 
Real output  grows  slowly  throughout  1971,  although  there  is a big increase 
in output  in 1971:  1 due  to recovery  from  the strike  at General  Motors,  and 
output  in 1971  :3 is depressed  because  of the effects  of an assumed  sixty-day Charles  W.  Bischoff  37 
steel strike.  The growth  rate accelerates  in 1972  and 1973.  These  assump- 
tions correspond  to a gross national  product  in current  prices of $1,046 
billion  in 1971  and $1,137  billion  in 1972,  or $743  billion  and $780  billion, 
respectively,  in 1958  prices. 
Inflation  is assumed  to continue,  though at a decreasing  rate. The de- 
flator for gross national product  rises 3.9 percent  between 1970:4 and 
1971:4,  and  3.1 percent  between  1971:4  and 1972:4.  Tax  rates  and  govern- 
ment spending  are projected  at the officially  planned  levels,  and monetary 
policy  is assumed  to hold bond  yields  approximately  at their 1971:  1 levels 
(this  corresponds  to about  5 percent  annual  growth  in the narrowly  defined 
money supply).  Thus real interest  rates on bonds increase  slightly  as the 
rate of inflation  (and the expected  rate of inflation)  gradually  decreases. 
Corporate  cash flow is assumed  to grow rapidly  in response  to the re- 
covery  and  to the influence  of liberalized  depreciation  policies,  as specified 
below.  From  the strike-depressed  level of cash  flow in 1970:4,  a rise of 40 
percent  is projected  by 1973:2. 
The current  stock  market  recovery  is assumed  to continue,  with Stan- 
dard  and Poor's  index  of the prices  of 500 common  stocks  rising  from  its 
March  1971  level  of around  100  to an average  of 116 in 1973:2  (1941-43 = 
10). This would represent  a 46 percent  increase  from the 79.2 low  of 
1970:2;  it may  be compared  with  the 45 percent  increase  in equity  values  in 
the nine-quarter  period  1966:3-1968:4,  the 62 percent  rise in the fourteen 
quarters  1962:2-1965:4,  and  the 74 percent  rise  in the ten quarters  1953  :4- 
1956:2.  A 54 percent  rise  over  the 1970:2  low is projected  for  the aggregate 
market  value of corporate  bonds. 
The rates  of increase  in the price  deflators  for equipment  and construc- 
tion expenditures  are  assumed  to decline  gradually  from  their  current  high 
rates;  the assumptions  about  these  deflators  differ  slightly  from  projection 
to projection,  as they depend  partly  on the strength  of the demand  for the 
capital  goods  in question. 
Generally  speaking,  these assumptions  are consistent  with one another. 
They  have  been  derived,  with some  adjustments,  from  the two most recent 
forecasts  made  by Michael  K. Evans  with the forecasting  model of Chase 
Econometric  Associates,  Inc.29 
29. I am grateful  to Dr. Evans for supplying  the forecasts  and granting  permission 
to use them, and for making suggestions  on how to adjust his variable  definitions  to 
correspond  with mine. I have assumed a slightly tighter monetary  policy than he has 
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STRIKE  ADJUSTMENT 
A set of adjustments  is required  in light of the automobile  strike  of late 
1970  and  the possible  steel  strike  of 1971,  both  to smooth  the assumed  path 
of output  and to correct  for the delay  in deliveries  of equipment,  particu- 
larly  trucks. 
The  rationale  behind  the output  adjustment  is as follows:  The  auto  strike 
should  have virtually  no effect  on the future  investment  plans of General 
Motors.  Most of the effects  on output  are  viewed  as transitory;  this applies 
to both the depressed  levels of the last half of 1970  and to the stimulated 
levels  of the first  half  of 1971,  when  previously  unsatisfied  customers  sought 
accommodation.  Thus, the output  numbers  that influence  GM's expecta- 
tion of future  output,  on which  planned  capital  stock or capacity  is based, 
should  have  the values  they  would  have  assumed  had there  been  no strike. 
Though  the precise  effect of the sixty-eight-day  strike,  extending  from 
September  15 to November  23, 1970,  is not known,  it appears  that gross 
auto product  in constant  dollars,  seasonally  adjusted  at annual  rates,  was 
depressed  by about $12  billion  in 1970:4.30 Recovery  from  the strike,  even 
if not all lost sales  are  made  up, should  inflate  the annual  rate  of real  busi- 
ness gross  product  by about $5 billion  in each of the first  two quarters  of 
1971.  To remove  the effects  of the strike  I have adjusted  output  by these 
amounts.  Similar  adjustments  have been made to remove  the projected 
effect  of a steel strike. 
This  adjustment  reduces  the error  in 1970:4  for all equations  that  include 
output,  and substantially  increases  projected  investment  spending  in early 
1971.  Similar  adjustments  to the cash  flow and securities  value  time series 
might  be appropriate.  However,  it can be argued  that the disturbances  to 
cash flow, though  transitory,  do constrain  in a very real way the money 
available  for investment,  dividends,  or other  uses.  As for the stock  market, 
it is virtually  impossible  to determine  how much  difference  the strike  made. 
To the extent  that investors  discounted  the strike  as a temporary  aberra- 
tion, there  should  be little effect. 
>  The second adjustment  is made for the equipment  expenditures,  espe- 
cially  on trucks,  that  had  to be postponed  as a result  of the General  Motors 
work stoppage.  In addition,  most investment  by General  Motors  was ap- 
30. The seasonally  adjusted  numbers  published  by the Office  of Business  Economics 
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parently  delayed  during  the strike.  I assume  that all desired  purchases  in 
1970:3  could  be made  out of dealer  inventories,  but that $2 billion  in real 
investment  was  postponed  in 1970:4.31  This  was allowed  for  by subtracting 
$2 billion  from  the intercept  of all equipment  equations  in 1970:4  and  add- 
ing $1 billion  in each  of the first  two quarters  of 1971  (assuming  that  half  of 
the postponed  investment  took place  in each of these  two quarters). 
THE  NEW  DEPRECIATION  REGULATIONS 
I have  assumed  that  the new  depreciation  regulations  will  take effect  and 
that no further  changes  in tax laws will be made.  The new regulations  in- 
volve  three  changes,  all of which  have  the effect  of permitting  firms  to take 
depreciation  for tax purposes  earlier  than  had previously  been  allowed:  (1) 
institution  of a new  depreciation  method,  called  the asset  depreciation  range 
(ADR) system,  which  would  allow  firms  to use tax lifetimes  for equipment 
that, in most cases,  are 20 percent  shorter  than those previously  in effect; 
(2) repeal  of the reserve  ratio  test, which  implied  that sooner  or later  firms 
would  have  to prove  that  the lifetimes  they assumed  for tax purposes  were 
not very different  from  the economic  lifetimes  in actual  practice;  and (3) 
under  the modified  first-year  convention,  permission  to firms  to treat  any 
equipment  they  have  purchased  less  than  six  months  before  the end of their 
fiscal  years  as if they had held it for fully six months,  and equipment  be- 
tween  six months  and a year old as if it were  fully a year old. 
If, for example,  a firm  whose fiscal  year corresponded  to the calendar 
year  purchased  a machine  for $1,000  in the second  quarter,  it could  deduct 
in that year,  under  the old rules,  only one-half  of the ordinary  first  year's 
depreciation  allowance.  A machine  with  a ten-year  lifetime  for  tax  purposes, 
eligible  for the double-declining-balance  depreciation  method, would be 
eligible  for  a $100  deduction  (half  of the ordinary  deduction  for the first  full 
year),  and  thus  the firm  would  pay $48  less  taxes  for  that  year,  based  on the 
normal  corporate  rate. 
Under  the new  rules,  the firm  will  be able  to deduct  a full  year's  deprecia- 
tion, and  in addition  the  machine  will  now  generally  have  an assumed  eight- 
year  service  lifetime  (regardless  of the actual  useful  lifetime).  The full  year's 
deduction  will thus rise to $250, and the tax saving  will be $120. 
Of course, for any one machine  later deductions  will be smaller,  and 
31. I base this estimate  on oral  comments  by Alan Greenspan  and Michael  K. Evans. 40  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1971 
thus  the reductions  are  in essence  only interest-free  loans from  the govern- 
ment.  But such  "loans"  are  no less valuable  than others,  and  the FMP and 
SNC models take this into account  by including  the present  discounted 
value of future  depreciation  deductions  as a factor in the rental  cost of 
equipment.  As long as investment  rises  over  time,  the increments  to corpo- 
rate cash flow resulting  from the additional  tax savings  in the first few 
years  on new  equipment  will  exceed  the opposite  effect  resulting  from  lower 
deductions  later  on for any given  piece of equipment. 
I have estimated  that, under  the new policy,  the reduction  in Treasury 
revenues  will be $1.6  billion  in 1971  and approximately  $3 billion  in 1973. 
These estimated  reductions  (shown in detail in Table 10) are somewhat 
smaller  than those reported  by the Treasury  Department,  because  I have 
assumed  that, at least initially,  not all firms  will take advantage  of the tax 
savings.32  Using  a 48 percent  tax  rate,  I have  calculated  the effects  assuming 
full adoption  of the new  rules  and  20 percent  shorter  lifetimes  for all equip- 
ment, and have  then reduced  these estimates  by 20 percent.33 
ADJUSTMENT  FOR 1970  ERRORS 
Adjustments  must also be made  for incorrect  predictions  of the models, 
stemming  from  sources  other  than  the auto strike,  in the quarters  immedi- 
ately preceding  the projection  period.  From a number  of methods  of ad- 
justment,34  I have  chosen  projection  of the variables  in the first-differenced 
32. Other policies that permit accelerated  depreciation  of capital goods have not 
been fully adopted by business  firms,  even many years after their implementation.  One 
example  is the accelerated  depreciation  methods  made  available  in 1954.  Allan H. Young 
has concluded  that from 1960  to 1966  only 79 percent  of the assets  purchased  by manu- 
facturers  were  depreciated  under  the new  methods,  and that other  business  purchasers  ap- 
plied the methods  to only 56 percent  of their purchases  of equipment  and 64 percent  of 
their  purchases  of structures.  Allan H. Young, "Alternative  Estimates  of Corporate  De- 
preciation  and Profits: Part I," Survey  of Current  Business,  Vol. 48 (April 1968), pp. 
17-28. 
33. Not all corporations  are taxed at this rate, and not all investment  is carried  out 
by corporations;  these facts also call for reduced  estimates. 
34. I have also considered  the technique  of autoregressive  adjustment  in making  the 
projections.  That approach  uses the first-order  autoregressive  process  built into the esti- 
mation  procedure  as a means  of adjusting  for the last observed  error.  It allows that error 
to die out gradually  in a pattern  of geometric  decay. The projections  for 1971  based on 
this method are rather  close to those using the first-difference  technique.  In addition,  I 
considered  whether  a reasonable  adjustment  could  be made  on the basis  of informed  judg- 
ment and examination  of the 1969-70 residuals.  The adjustments  already  described  for 
the auto strike  incorporate  as much a priori  information  as I am willing to use at this Charles  W. Bischoff  41 
form. It is consistent with the theory that, at least in the short run, the 
effects of past errors do not die out, and it has been used extensively by 
practicing forecasters. The advantages have been summarized by Daniel 
Suits. Three of his reasons for using this method apply in this case: 
. . . In short-run  analysis  and forecasting,  the present  position is known, and 
ceteris  paribus  will continue.  The important  question  is what change  from that 
position will result  from projected  changes  in other factors....  The use of first 
differences  minimizes  the effect of slowly moving variables  such as population, 
tastes, technical  change,  etc., without explicitly  introducing  them into the anal- 
ysis....  Finally,  use of first  differences  minimizes  the complications  produced  by 
data revision....  Revisions  usually alter the level at which variables  are mea- 
sured,  rather  than their  year-to-year  variation.35 
It can be shown that the use of first differences  is mathematically equiva- 
lent to  adjusting the intercept of the equation so that it fits perfectly in 
1970:4, and then making all projections with this altered equation. In ap- 
plying  this  method  I  have  retained  the  strike  adjustments described 
earlier. 
The 1971-73  Outlook  for Fixed  Investment 
The ten basic equations have been projected for the ten quarters from 
1971: 1 through 1973:2, on the basis of the first-differences  technique. These 
projections use assumptions about the time paths of the determinants of 
investment that have been outlined above and that are described in greater 
detail in Appendix C.36  The projections are listed in Table 8 and plotted in 
time. However, the recent and continuing boom in the investment  of such regulated 
industries  as electric  utilities  and communications  provides  an alternative  basis for ad- 
justing the intercept. 
I have made several  sets of simulations  using  judgmental  intercept  adjustments  based 
on such information.  In general  these simulations  are similar  to the first-differenced  pro- 
jections; they tend to be somewhat  lower because the judgmental  adjustments  do not 
raise the estimates  quite as much as the intercept  adjustment  for the 1970:4 errors. 
35. Daniel B. Suits, "Forecasting  and Analysis  with an Econometric  Model," Ameri- 
can Economic  Review,  Vol. 52 (March 1962),  pp. 104-32. Quote is from p. 112. 
36. The three  alternate  equations,  which  take capital gains on investment  goods into 
account,  have also been extrapolated,  but the results  are totally implausible,  as projected 
expenditures  in real terms first swing rapidly  upward  and then plunge equally rapidly. 
This is a result of a sQmewhat  unstable  response  to the initial price expectation  terms, 
which push the projected  rental  value toward zero. A more sophisticated  treatment  of 
capital gains expectations  might well remedy  this defect. 42  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1971 
Table 8.  First-Differenced  Projections of Capital Investment, 
Using Specified Assumptions,  Five Models, 1971-73 
Billions of 1958  dollars,  seasonally  adjusted  at annual  rates; numbers  in parentheses  are 
percentage  changes  from previous  period 
Federal 
Year  Securities  Standard  Reserve-MIT- 
and half  Accelerator  Cash  flow  value  neoclassical  Penn 
Equipment  expenditures 
1971 First  56.3 (+1)  56.4 (+1)  53.3 (-4)  56.6 (+2)  56.9 (+2) 
Second  54.7 (-3)  55.2 (-2)  56.2 (+5)  55.3 (-2)  58.8 (+3) 
1972 First  55.7 (+2)  55.4 (  0)  61.0 (+9)  55.1(  0)  62.7 (+7) 
Second  58.2 (+4)  57.2 (+3)  64.6 (+6)  55.0 (  0)  66.5 (+6) 
1973 First  61.1 (+5)  59.8 (+5)  67.7 (+5)  55.4 (+1)  69.7 (+5) 
Construction  expeniditures 
1971 First  21.6 (-2)  21.2 (-4)  19.0 (-14)  20.6 (-7)  20.6 (-7) 
Second  21.6 (  0)  20.8 (-2)  17.2 (-9)  19.1 (-7)  20.2 (-2) 
1972 First  21.9 (+1)  20.6 (-1)  17.8 (+3)  17.9 (-6)  20.4 (+1) 
Second  22.8 (+4)  20.8 (+1)  19.2 (+8)  17.2 (-4)  21.3 (+4) 
1973 First  24.1 (+6)  21.4 (+3)  20.4 (+6)  17.5 (+2)  22.0 (+3) 
Total 
1971 First  77.9 (  0)  77.6 (  0)  72.3 (-7)  77.2 (-1)  77.5 (-1) 
Second  76.3 (-2)  76.0 (-2)  73.4 (+2)  74.4 (-4)  79.0 (+2) 
1972 First  77.6 (+2)  76.0 (  0)  78.8 (+7)  73.0 (-2)  83.1 (+5) 
Second  81.0 (+4)  78.0 (+3)  83.8 (+6)  72.2 (-1)  87.8 (+5) 
1973 First  85.2 (+5)  81.2 (+4)  88.1 (+5)  72.9 (+1)  91.7 (+4) 
Source: Same as Figure 1. 
Figure  1.37  It is striking  that four of the five equations  (the exception  is 
the securities  value  equation,  with its long lags) project  almost  exactly  the 
same path for equipment  spending  in 1971  :1 and 1971:2 (see Figure 1). 
After  this point the paths  diverge,  although  the accelerator  and cash flow 
projections  move  together,  as do the FMP and  securities  value  projections. 
It is also striking  that,  whatever  the level,  these  four  equations  all project  a 
10 percent  rise  (annual  rate)  in equipment  spending  in the first  half of 1973 
compared  with the last half of 1972.  The exception  is the SNC equation, 
which  projects  an almost  completely  flat path of real investment  from  the 
second  half of 1971  to the first  half of 1973.  As before,  it is the weakness  of 
the accelerator  effect  in this equation,  as well as the low long-run  output 
multiplier,  that  accounts  for the pessimistic  view. 
37. Proje,cted  levels as well as percentage  changes  are shown in Table 8. If the invest- 
ment data for 1970 are subsequently  revised,  the levels of all projected  variables  should 
be revised  by an equal amount. Charles W. Bischoff  43 
Figure 1.  Capital Expenditures,  Actual, 1969-70, Projected, 1971-73 
Billions  of 1958 dollars,  seasonally  adjusted  anlnual  rate 
70 
/.' 
65  FMP  / 
/  Securities 
Equipment  expenditures  /  value 
60/ 





Construction  expenditures  .  >  _,' 
15 
0  1-  f  I  I  I  I 
1969  1970  1971  1972  1973 
Note:  All projections are made using first differences. 
Sources:  1969-70-Survey  of Current  Business, Vol. 50 (July 1970), p. 17, and Vol. 51 (March 1971), p. 9; 
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The cash  flow equation  for equipment  yields  a path  similar  to that  based 
on the accelerator  equation.  But that result  comes  about only because  the 
cash  flow intercept  has been adjusted  upward  by $10.3  billion  to offset its 
underprediction  in 1970:4.  Even  with  this  boost the projection  shows  stag- 
nation  between  the first  half of 1971  and  the first  half of 1972. 
The  difference  between  the accelerator  and  FMP projections  is accounted 
for by (1) the slightly  higher  output  multipliers  in the FMP equation;  (2) 
the effect  of the new  depreciation  rules,  which  adds  $3.0  billion  to the FMP 
projection  by 1973:2; (3) a decrease  in the nominal  industrial  bond yield 
from  a high  of 8.48  percent  in 1970:3  to an assumed  level  of 7.37  percent  in 
1972 and 1973  ;38  and (4) a decrease  in the industrial  dividend  yield from 
0.0337  in 1970:4  (and  an  earlier  high  of 0.0392)  to an assumed  low of 0.0287 
in 1972:1 (the effect  is damped  by an assumed  recovery  of the dividend 
yield to 0.0316  in 1973:2). 
If anything,  I feel I have  been conservative  in assuming  no further  drop 
in corporate  bond yields  below levels  prevailing  in March  1971.  Also, the 
projected  effect  of the new depreciation  rules  may  be conservative  in so far 
as it assumes  only 80 percent  adoption.  The conclusion  is that the projec- 
tion of nearly  $70  billion  by FMP for the first  half of 1973  is not an unrea- 
sonably  high one. Nevertheless,  I am a bit unhappy  about  the unexplained 
intercept  adjustment  of $3.15  billion  that  underlies  this  figure.  I believe  that 
at least some of this represents  transitory  errors,  and my "best  guess"  for 
equipment  spending  at that stage  would  be about $68 billion, halfway  be- 
tween  the first-differenced  and unadjusted  projections. 
The securities  value  projection,  which  bounces  back  quickly  from  an un- 
reasonable  low in the first  half  of 1971,  reinforces  my conclusion.  However, 
given the inevitable  uncertainty  about a stock market  forecast  so far in 
advance,  the numbers  projected  from this equation  must be considered 
highly  speculative. 
As Figure  1 shows,  the projections  for  construction  differ  widely.  The ac- 
celerator  projections  are the most optimistic.  The SNC projections  seem 
clearly  too pessimistic,  as are the projections  for 1971  from  the securities 
value  equation.  This  leaves  the cash  flow and  FMP projections,  which  are 
38. It should be noted, however, that the "real" interest rate falls much less from 
0.0417 (that is, 0.0848 minus 0.0431) in 1970:3 to 0.0404 (or 0.0737 minus 0.0333) in 
1973.2, as the rate of inflation  declines.  There  is, however,  a large temporary  stimulus, 
because  the rate of inflation  declines only gradually. Charles  W. Bischoff  45 
close together  but seem a bit low. I am convinced  that the price of con- 
struction  does have some  negative  effect,  but not as much  as is implied  by 
the equations  with unitary  price elasticities  (SNC, securities  value, cash 
flow). My best guess  for the path of construction  spending  is between  the 
accelerator  and FMP paths,  implying  an annual  rate of about $23 billion 
(1958  prices)  for early 1973. 
Some  of the implications  of the projections  for outlays  in current  dollars 
are  reported  in Table  9. These  numbers  are  all  based  on the two FMP  equa- 
tions, as projected  in first-differenced  form.  As indicated  above,  I feel the 
equipment  projections  may be a bit high, especially  for the latter  part of 
the period,  while the construction  projections  seem too low. With these 
caveats,  these  equations  give  the results  that, to me, seem  the most reason- 
able and the most likely to be realized.  The 1971 outlook is for current- 
dollar  expenditures  of $106.4  billion,  a rise  of 3.7 percent  above  1970,  with 
the level  in 1958  prices  at $78.2  billion,  a 1.3 percent  decline. 
Table 9.  Actual Investment,  1969-70, and First-Differenced  Projections, 
1971-73, FMP Model 
Total  nonresidential 
Equipment  Construction  fixed private 
expenditures  expenditures  investment 
Percent  Percent  Percent 
Year  Amount  increase  Amount  increase  Amount  increase 
Billions  of 1958 dollars 
1969  56.9  24.0  80.8 
1970  56.1  -1.4  23.1  -3.8  79.2  -2.0 
1971  57.8  +3.0  20.4  -11.7  78.2  -1.3 
1972  64.6  +11.8  20.9  +2.4  85.5  +9.3 
1973  (first 
half)a  69.7  +11.1  22.0  +7.8  91.7  +10.2 
Billions  of current  dollars 
1969  65.5  33.8  99.3 
1970  67.4  +2.9  35.2  +4.1  102.6  +3.3 
1971  72.3  +7.3  34.2  -2.8  106.4  +3.7 
1972  83.5  +15.5  37.2  +8.8  120.7  +13.4 
1973  (first 
half)"  91.3  +13.3  40.9  +13.8  132.2  +13.5 
Sources: 1969-70 values, Survey of Current  Business,  Vol. 51 (March 1971), p. 9; 1971-73 values, author's 
estimates. Details may not add to totals because of rounding. 
a.  Seasonally adjusfed at annual rates. Percent increase shown is for 1973 first half over 1972 first half. 46  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1971 
Some  Variations  on the Projections 
In order  to explore  more  fully  the implications  of the models  for the in- 
vestment  outlook  in the next  few years,  I have  made  several  supplementary 
calculations.  One identifies  the differences  in investment  spending  between 
projections  that include  and those that exclude  the new depreciation  poli- 
cies.  The second  simulation  shows  the additional  investment  that  would  be 
forthcoming  on the basis of a more  bullish  overall  economic  outlook  con- 
sistent  with  the administration's  forecast  of GNP for 1971  at $1,065  billion. 
The  third  simulation  considers  the effect  of different  assumptions  about  the 
path of the stock market  on the investment  projections  of the securities 
value model. 
DEPRECIATION 
Table 10 records  the differences  in projected  investment  that may result 
from the new depreciation  policies. Since the effects  are included  in the 
projections  reviewed  above, the investment  amounts  shown in the table 
may be regarded  either  as the contribution  of the new regulations  to pro- 
spective  investment  or as the loss of investment  that would  come about if 
the regulations  are  not put into effect.  Since  both equipment  and  construc- 
tion expenditures  are affected  by cash  flow, the calculated  effects  use both 
cash flow equations.  For the SNC and FMP models,  only equipment  ex- 
penditures  are influenced.  The accelerator  equation  is omitted;  it would 
show  zero  impact  by assumption.  The  SNC  equation  projects  a very  prompt 
and large impact, exceeding  the direct revenue  loss to the Treasury  by 
1971:3.  The  FMP and  cash  flow  equations  show  smaller  and  more  gradual 
responses.  Nonetheless,  by the end of 1972,  the direct  impacts  come very 
close to the revenue  losses  for the cash  flow  equations,  and  exceed  the reve- 
nue losses for the FMP equation.  These impacts  for FMP and cash flow 
thus also imply  a big "bang  for a buck"  although  only after  a substantial 
lag. 
The impacts  are  labeled  "direct"  because  they do not include  the secon- 
dary,  induced  effects  that would  work  through  changes  in incomes,  interest 
rates, and so on, resulting  from the initial additional  investment.  Such 
effects  could  be appraised  only by using  a complete  econometric  model. 
The qualitative  character  of some of the secondary,  complete  model ef- 
fects can, however,  be identified.  The increases  in equipment  spending N  00  N 
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should  be partially  offset  by substitution  away from structures,  although 
the multiplier-accelerator  effects  should guarantee  that, on balance,  con- 
struction  of nonresidential  buildings  will  rise.  Housing  should,  at least  rela- 
tively,  be hurt. 
It does  make  a difference,  however,  which  one of the models  most  closely 
reproduces  reality.  I find  somewhat  comforting  the fact  that,  for  this  policy, 
the computed  effects  do not differ  by much  more  than  50 percent  by the end 
of the projection  period.  I do think  the short-run  effects  computed  from  the 
SNC model are too large. The cash flow equations  must be considered 
conservative,  and also suspect  because  the equations  performed  poorly 
when  projected  in 1969  and 1970.  I would  therefore  select  the result  of the 
FMP equation  as the most reliable  projection. 
ALTERNATIVE  'GOVERNMENT  ECONOMIC  FORECAST' 
An alternative  set of simulations  has been made, using the widely  dis- 
cussed government  forecast  underlying  the President's  budget  projection, 
in which the current-dollar  GNP rises to $1,065  billion in 1971.  The as- 
sumptions  for these projections  are also derived  from a simulation  of the 
Chase  Econometrics  model.  The model  attains  the higher  growth  path as a 
result  of increases  in the intercepts  of the automobile,  inventory,  and  hous- 
ing demand  equations.  These adjustments  correspond  to exogenous  in- 
creases  in demand,  and since the adjusted  equations  are used through- 
out the simulation  period,  output  is higher  in 1972  and 1973 as well. The 
precise  nature  of the "government  forecast"  assumptions  is recorded  in 
Appendix  C. 
Table 11 gives  the results  of the projections  based  on these  assumptions. 
For 1971,  the various  models indicate  impacts  of $1.0 billion for the ac- 
celerator  model, $0.7 billion  for cash  flow, $0.4 billion  for SNC, and $1.4 
billion  for FMP (all in real terms).  Clearly  the realization  of this forecast 
will depend  on the strength  of exogenous  spending  in other sectors;  the 
impetus  will not come from investment.  In 1972,  however,  higher  growth 
leads  to larger  effects.  The FMP equation  indicates  an addition  of $3.7  bil- 
lion in 1972  if, somehow,  the 1971  growth  target  is realized. 
ALTERNATIVE  STOCK  MARKET  PROJECTIONS 
Two  alternative  paths  for  the stock  market  are  assumed  and  their  impacts 
are  calculated  using  the securities  value  equations.  In the "bearish"  set of Charles  W. Bischoff  49 
Table 11. Additional  Investment  Projected under  "Government 
Forecast" Assumptions,  Four Models, 1971-73 
Billions  of 1958 dollars,  seasonally  adjusted  at annual  rates 
Year  Federal 
and  Standard  Reserve- 
half  Accelerator  Cash  flow  neoclassical  MIT-Penn 
Equipment  expenditures 
1971 First  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.5 
Second  1.3  1.0  0.6  2.0 
1972 First  2.2  1.6  0.9  2.8 
Second  2.6  1.6  0.9  3.0 
1973 First  2.4  1.2  0.9  2.8 
Construction  expenditures 
1971 First  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Second  0.5  0.2  0.2  0.3 
1972 First  0.9  0.5  0.4  0.6 
Second  1.0  0.5  0.5  0.8 
1973 First  0.9  0.4  0.5  0.7 
Sources: Author's estimates. See Appendix C for "government forecast" assumptions. 
assumptions,  no increase  at all occurs  in equity  values  over the next ten 
quarters  (of course,  the market  could  actually  decline).  In the other  alterna- 
tive, a rise  of nearly  63 percent  in equity  values  is assumed  between  1970:2 
and  1973  :2. This  rate  of increase  is exceeded  only  in the greatest  bull  market 
in postwar  history,  the boom between  1953:4 and 1956:2. 
The alternative  stock  market  projections  lead to the results  in Table 12. 
The most bullish  assumed  path pushes  equipment  spending  projected  by 
the securities  value equation  up to a level higher  than that in any other 
projection,  though  construction  spending  is still projected  at a lower  level 
than is implied  by the accelerator  equation. 
If the market  were  in fact to rise  this much,  the ratio of securities  value 
to reproduction  cost of capital  would be pushed  from its low of 0.910 in 
1970:2 to 1.182  in 1973:2. 
The uncertainty  about  these  projections  must  be emphasized.  It is clear 
that the market  has already  bounced  back strongly.  The ratio of market 
values  to replacement  costs  has  risen  from  a low of 0.910  in 1970:2  to 0.961 
in 1970:4, and, according  to my preliminary  figures,  1.050  in 1971:  1. The 
"standard"  projection  raises  this ratio  to 1.104  by 1973:2,  while  in a mar- 
ket with no increases  the ratio would  decline  to 0.994. On the high path it 
would  be 1.182  in 1973:2.  The path implied  by the high projection  would 50  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1971 
Table  12.  Projections  of Investment  Spending  for  Alternative 
Paths of the Stock Market,  Securities  Value  Model,  1971-73 
Billions of 1958  dollars,  seasonally  adjusted  at annual  rates 
Movement  in 500-stock  indexa 
Remains  at  Rises to 116  Rises to 128 
Year  and half  100  in 1973:2  in 1973:2 
Equipment  expenditures 
1971 First  53.3  53.3  53.3 
Second  56.2  56.2  56.5 
1972 First  59.5  61.0  62.0 
Second  61.8  64.6  68.0 
1973 First  62.0  67.7  73.4 
Construction  expenditures 
1971 First  19.0  19.0  19.0 
Second  17.2  17.2  17.2 
1972 First  17.6  17.8  18.0 
Second  18.5  19.2  20.0 
1973 First  18.8  20.4  22.1 
Sources: Author's estimates. 
a.  Standard and Poor Corporation's combined index of 500 stocks (1941-43  =  10). 
require  an additional  rise  in the ratio  of equity  values  to replacement  costs 
that is roughly  as large  as the rebound  that has already  taken  place. 
Conclusion 
This  paper  has attempted  to peek  into the future  a bit farther  ahead  than 
would  be possible  using  only anticipatory  data or leading  indicators  of in- 
vestment  such  as appropriations,  orders,  or  building  contracts.  I have  intro- 
duced  a variety  of models,  some  of which  must  be adjudged  less than  total 
successes.  I have  emphasized  a range  of uncertainty.  On balance,  however, 
I feel that the FMP equations  are  most reliable  for projecting  the outlook, 
with the accelerator  projection  providing  the most plausible alternative 
to it. There  is enough  diversity  in the projections  to encourage  the hope  that 
new data  will facilitate  discrimination  among  the models. 
All of the projections  are predicated  on the implementation  of new de- 
preciation  rules,  although,  at the time  this is written,  these  rules  are  not yet 
formally  effective.  Further  delay  or uncertainty  about  the legal  effect  of the 
new rules could considerably  dampen  the outlook. In any case, neither Charles  W. Bischoff  51 
these  regulations  nor reinstatement  of the investment  tax credit,  which  has 
been suggested,  could  be expected  to have  large  immediate  effects,  though 
both apparently  would have substantial  long-run impacts, unless the 
accelerator  is accepted  as the best representation  of investment  behavior. 
The  year  1971  will  be another  year  of stagnation  for  business  fixed  invest- 
ment.  Nonetheless,  a rebound  in 1972  and  1973  is projected  by most  models, 
and in the FMP and securities  value  models,  the magnitude  and speed  of 
the rise could  be said  to characterize  at least a "boomlet."  Although  none 
of the  models  shows  investment  as a dynamic  sector  leading  the prospective 
recovery,  it is not likely  to drag  far  behind  the rest  of the economy.  Accord- 
ing to the more optimistic  projections-which, I feel, are also the ones 
most apt to be realized-if real output  grows significantly  as a result of 
strength  in other  sectors,  substantial  gains  in real investment  are  likely  to 
follow. 
APPENDIX A 
Dynamic  Investment  Responses 
in Three  Models 
To  TRACE THE DYNAMIC RESPONSE  through the accelerator,  standard 
neoclassical,  and  putty-clay  models,  consider  an  industry  producing  a single 
homogeneous  product,  say, shoes. Suppose  that this industry  is monopo- 
lized by a single  company,  the Achilles  Footwear  Company,'  that shoes 
are  an absolute  necessity,  and  that demand  is 50 million  pairs  per  year,  re- 
gardless  of price. Nevertheless,  Achilles sells its shoes at marginal  cost, 
because  it fears  entry  by competitors. 
Fixed  Proportions-Accelerator  Model 
Suppose  that  in order  to produce  5,000  pairs  of shoes  per  year,  the single 
available  technology  requires  one machine,  which  may be rented  from  the 
Ajax  Shoe  Machinery  Company  for $10,000  per  year,  and  five  man-years  of 
1. The industry  might  just as well be competitive,  but then there  is a question  of how 
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labor,  which  may be hired  at a wage  of $8,000  per  man-year.  Each  pair of 
shoes also requires  10 cents'  worth of leather.  Thus, shoes sell for $10.10 
per pair. 
Now, suppose  that  the machines  are  built  to last forever,  but that never- 
theless  10  percent  of them  break  down  permanently  each  year  (sabotaged  by 
a disgruntled  worker,  or neglected  by a careless  maintenance  man, for ex- 
ample)  and  that  these  breakdowns  are  equally  likely  regardless  of the age  of 
the machine  (a nonessential  but simplifying  assumption).  Given 10,000 
machines-each costing  Ajax $50,000-of  which 1,000  break  down each 
year, gross investment  per year for the shoe machinery  industry  is $50 
million. 
What will be the response  if, in a given year, demand  increases  to 60 
million  pairs,  requiring  2,000  more  machines?  If the firms  that supply  Ajax 
with  equipment  manage  to triple  their  output,  gross  investment  for  the year 
in question  will  rise  to 3,000  machines,  or $150  million.  In each subsequent 
year,  the usual 10 percent  of all machines  break  down, and thus gross  in- 
vestment  settles  down  to a new  level of 1,200  machines,  or $60 million  per 
year.  This is the familiar  acceleration  principle  in action. 
Ex Ante  Variable  Proportions-Putty-Clay  Model 
Suppose  that  instead  of a single  technology,  there  are  a variety  of ways  to 
make shoes; here are data per machine  for three methods,  all of which 
produce  5,000  pairs  per year: 
Cost 
per new 
machine  Rental  Workers 
$40,000  $ 8,000  5.275 
50,000  10,000  5.000 
60,000  12,000  4.775 
With either  the $40,000  or $60,000  machine,  and one-man-year  wages of 
$8,000,  the cost of shoes is $10.14.  Thus, the $50,000  machine  is used at 
this wage.  If wages  rise  to $10,000  per  year,  the cost of shoes  produced  on 
the $50,000  machine  rises to $12.10  per pair,  while  the cost of those pro- 
duced  on the $60,000  machine  rises  only  to $12.05.  To avoid  junking  all of 
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and writes off its losses, but it orders  only $60,000  machines  to replace 
those  that  break  down.  With  continuing  breakdowns  of 1,000  machines  per 
year,  gross  investment  in the industry  rises  to, and  stays  at, $60  million  per 
year. 
If the wage did not change,  but demand  increased  in the way assumed 
earlier,  the investment  response  in this model  would  be exactly  the same  as 
that in the accelerator  model.  The difference  lies only in the response  to a 
change  in relative  prices-in this case  the wage  of man-years  relative  to the 
rental  on machines.  The response  to a change  in the interest  rate  (which  is 
a factor underlying  the rental price charged  by Ajax and which I have 
implicitly  assumed  is 10 percent)  would  follow the same  dynamic  pattern. 
Also, the response  would be the same  if Achilles  owned  the machines  in- 
stead  of renting  them. 
This type of model is known  popularly  as the "putty-clay"  model, be- 
cause factor proportions  are variable-like putty-before machines  are 
built, purchased,  and bolted down, but are fixed-like  clay-once  they 
are in place. 
Freely  Variable  Factor  Proportions-Standard  Neoclassical  Model 
Now suppose  that the $50,000  machines  can, at a cost of $10,000,  be 
made  identical  to the $60,000  machines,  even after  they are bolted  down. 
Then,  in the year of the wage  change,  instead  of lowering  the rent on old 
machines,  Ajax  would  simply  order  10,000  adaption  kits.  This  would  count 
as gross  investment,  and  thus the investment  aggregate  would  rise  to $150 
million for one year,  then settle back down to $60 million  per year. The 
effects  of a change  in demand  are  the same  as in the accelerator  model,  and 
the investment  response  in this  model  is thus  identical  for changes  in output 
and changes  in relative  prices.  The standard  neoclassical  model  essentially 
assumes  that something  like this can occur,  although  the example  is over- 
simplified. 
To sum up the exercise:  In all three  models  the response  to a change  in 
output  is the same.  The reaction  to a change  in wages  (or, in more  general 
models,  to interest  rates,  tax credits,  and other  variables)  is quite  different. 
In the accelerator  model  there  is no response.  In the standard  neoclassical 
model,  the reaction  is identical  to the response  to an equivalent  change  in 
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much  different.  In particular,  it should  be noted that the level of gross  in- 
vestment  in the  transition  to the more  expensive  machines  never  overshoots 
its new long-run  level. 
APPENDIX B 
Statistical  Notes 
THE CAPITAL  STOCKS  included  in each  of the equations  were  derived  as fol- 
lows: First,  benchmarks  for the net stocks  of equipment  and structures  at 
the end of 1946  and 1965  were  taken  from  the U.S. Office  of Business  Eco- 
nomics,  OBE  Capital  Goods Study,  in the Survey  of Current  Business,  Vol- 
ume  49 (February  1969),  pages  23 and  26. These  were  118.7  and 227.8  (bil- 
lions  of 1958  dollars)  for structures  and  75.8 and  204.0  for equipment.  Then 
the systems  of equations  given  by 
Kt =  0.25It +  (1 -d)Kt-1, 
where 
Kt = net capital  stock at the end of the period  t 
I,  =  gross  investment  in period  t, and 
d' =  quarterly  depreciation  rate, 
were  solved  for the values  of d' that  built  the stocks  up from  the 1946  levels 
to the 1965  levels,  using quarterly  time series  on investment  in structures 
and equipment.  The solved values of d' were approximately  0.0152 and 
0.0386.  Yearly  depreciation  rates  d were  derived  from  the values  of d' using 
the formula d =  1 -  (1 -  d')4. These were 0.0593 and 0.1457. 
In specifying  the Hall-Jorgenson  standard  neoclassical  model, I  have 
adopted  their specifications  wherever  possible.  The values of d are mine, 
rather  than  theirs.  I have  not included  Robert  A. Gordon's  data  on govern- 
ment-owned  capital used in  private production,  nor have I  adopted 
Gordon's  price  deflator  for nonresidential  construction,  because  the num- 
bers  were  not available  on a quarterly  basis. Following  Hall and Jorgen- 
son, I have (1) used 0.20(1 -  w) as the after-tax  discount  rate; (2) rep- 
resented  depreciation  patterns  after 1954 by the sum-of-the-years-digits 
formula;  and  (3) used  0.0587  (a weighted  average  of their  rates  for manu- Charles  W. Bischoff  55 
facturing  and nonmanufacturing)  for the effective  rate of the investment 
tax credit. 
For the FMP model  the discount  rate is 
[2(RCBI -  PX)  +  1RDPI](1 -  0.2w) 
for equipment  and 2RDPI(l -  0.2w) for structures.  RCBI is Moody's 
industrial  corporate  bond yield. PX is the expected  rate of price change 
derived  in Ando, Modigliani,  Rasche,  and  Turnovsky;  it is a geometrically 
declining  thirteen-quarter  lag on past changes  of the deflator  for private 
output, with nonlinear  threshold effects. RDPI is Moody's industrial 
dividend-price  ratio. The discounted  value of the depreciation  deduction, 
z, is computed  as 0.524zsyd  + 0.476zsl,  for equipment,  after 1954, and 
0.534zsyd  +  0.466zsl,  for structures;  zsyd  is the present  value  for sum-of- 
the-years-digits  depreciation  and zsl is the present  value for straight-line 
depreciation.  I have used 0.045 for the effective  rate of the tax credit  on 
equipment. 
Rough  estimates  of the market  value  of all nonfinancial  corporations  were 
derived  from a series,  supplied  by James  Tobin,  in which  net nonfinancial 
interest  payments  were  divided  by the interest  rate  on new corporate  issues 
and nonfinancial  dividend  payments  were  divided  by Moody's  composite 
dividend-price  ratio. 
APPENDIX C 
Assumptions  and Data Sources 
THE FOLLOWING  ARE  THE  BASIC  assumptions for the projections. 
1. Real business  gross  product  is assumed  to rise $14 billion in 1971:  1, 
under the influence  of recovery  from the automobile  strike, and to rise 
about  0.9 percent  per quarter  for the next four quarters,  except  for the ef- 
fects of a sixty-day  steel  strike  in 1971  :3. For the rest  of 1972,  the rise  is as- 
sumed to average  1.6 percent  per quarter,  with a slight slowing of real 
growth  in early 1973.  This projection  is consistent  with a 1971  gross na- 
tional product  of $1,046  billion in current  dollars,  or $743  billion  in con- 
stant  (1958)  dollars. 
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assumed  to decline  gradually  from 1.1 percent  per quarter  in early  1971  to 
0.9 percent  per  quarter  in early  1973. 
3.  The cashflow of domestic corporations  (profits after taxes plus capital 
consumption  allowances)  is assumed  to grow  from $94.2  billion  in 1970:3 
and a slightly  lower  level in 1970:4  to $128.2  billion  in 1973:2,  consistent 
with the recovery  of output and the increase  in depreciation  deductions 
under  the new government  policy.' 
4. Consistent  with the profits  and depreciation  assumptions,  the divi- 
dends  of nonfinancial  corporations  are  assumed  to rise  from  $21.8  billion  in 
1970:3 and a slightly  lower  level in 1970:4  to $27.4  billion  in 1973:2. 
5.  The market value of the equities of  nonfinancial corporations is as- 
sumed  to rise 22.6 percent  between  1971:1 and 1973:2.  This is consistent 
with a rise of the Standard  and  Poor Corporation's  combined  index  of 500 
stocks  from  a close of 100.31  on March  31, 1971,  to 116.0  in 1973:2  (1941- 
43 =  10). 
6. Assumptions  4 and 5 imply a path for Moody's composite  dividend 
yield,  determined  by dividing  dividends  by value  of equities  of nonfinancial 
corporations;  the  yield  declines  to 0.03  26 in 1972:  1 and  then  rises  gradually 
to 0.0355  in 1973  :2. The Moody's  industrial  dividend  yield is assumed  to 
move approximately  35 basis  points  below  the composite  yield. 
7.  The net interest  payments of nonfinancial  corporations  are assumed to 
rise from $14.5  billion  in 1970:4  to $17.4  billion  in 1973:2. 
8.  The yield on new issues of corporate bonds is assumed to  fall from 
0.0875 in 1970:4 to 0.0765 in 1971:1 and to remain  stable  at that level. 
Moody's composite corporate  bond  yield is assumed to decline from 0.0854 
in 1970:4  to 0.0787  in 1971:  1 and  then  to move gradually  towards  0.0765. 
Moody's industrial  bond  yield is assumed to decline from 0.0822 in 1970:4 
towards  a stable  level of 0.0737, remaining  3.75 percent  below the com- 
posite  yield. 
9. Assumptions  7 and  8 imply  a path  for the  market  value  of the  bonds  of 
nonfinancial  corporations,  evaluated  by dividing  net interest  payments  by 
the yield on corporate  new issues,  which  entails  a rise  from $166  billion  in 
1970:4  to $192  billion  in 1971:1 and then to $227  billion  in 1973:2. 
10. The price deflator  for  producers' durable equipment  is  assumed to 
rise, but at a gradually  decreasing  rate, from 1.223  in 1970:4 to approx- 
imately  1.313  in 1973:2,  varying  about  this path  in any given  simulation  in 
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accordance  with the degree  of inflation  induced  by the projected  demand 
for capital  goods. 
11. The price deflatorfor nonresidential  construction  is assumed to rise at 
a gradually  decreasing  rate  from  1.591  in 1970:4  to 1.865  in 1973  :2, varying 
about  this  path  in any  given  simulation  in accordance  with  the degree  of in- 
flation  induced  by the projected  demand  for capital  goods. 
Assumptions  3, 4, and  7, concerning  corporate  profits,  depreciation,  divi- 
dends,  and interest  payments  have been checked  for consistency  with the 
output  assumptions  using  equations  adapted  from  the forecasting  model  of 
Chase  Econometric  Associates,  Inc., made  available  with  the permission  of 
Michael  K. Evans.  Assumptions  10 and 11, concerning  the price  deflators 
for capital  goods, are derived  from  the two most recent  basic  solutions  of 
that model, and the formulas  used for varying  these prices  in individual 
simulations  are derived  from  the equations  from  that model.  The sources 
for this basic  solution  are  two unpublished  releases  of Chase  Econometric 
Associates, Inc., "Forecasts  of February  22, 1971" and "Forecasts  of 
March  23, 1971."  The source  for the model equations  is an unpublished 
notebook,  "Macro-Economic  Model,"  provided  by Dr. Evans. 
Assumptions  for "Government  Forecast"  Projections 
These simulations  assume  paths of business  gross product,  corporate 
cash  flows,  and  price  deflators  for business  gross  product,  equipment,  and 
nonresidential  construction  that are consistent  with achievement  of the 
government  "target"  of a $1,065 billion (current  dollars)  gross national 
product  in 1971.  Exogenous  upward  adjustments  sufficient  to attain  the tar- 
get are  made  in equations  for automobile  purchases,  inventory  investment, 
and  residential  construction.  The  source  is the release,  "Forecasts  of Febru- 
ary  22, 1971,"  mentioned  above. 
Sources  of Data 
Historical  data for the variables  listed  under  1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 10, and 11 are 
found in U.S. Department of Commerce, The National Income and Product 
Accounts of the United  States, 1929-1965; Statistical Tables (1966); Survey 
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ruary  1971).  Real business  gross  product  is found in Table 1.8, line 3, of 
National Income and Product Accounts and in the corresponding tables in 
Survey  of Current  Business.  The implicit  price  deflator  for business  gross 
product is in Table 8.4, line 3, in National Income and Product Accounts. 
Cash  flow of domestic  financial  corporations  is in Table 1.14,  line 16. Net 
interest  payments  and dividends  of nonfinancial  corporations  are  in Table 
1.14,  lines  24 and  29. Price  deflators  for equipment  and  nonresidential  con- 
struction  are in Table  8.1, lines 9 and 10. 
Historical  data  for  Moody's  dividend  yields  and  Moody's  bond  yields  are 
found in various  issues of Survey  of Current  Business,  generally  on page 
S-20,  and  in the supplement,  1969  Business  Statistics,  17th  Biennial  Edition 
(1970).  Historical  data for the yield on new issues of corporate  bonds are 
from  various  issues  of Business  Conditions  Digest,  listed  as Series  116.  The 
market  values  of bonds  and equities  of nonfinancial  corporations  were  cal- 
culated  by the author.  Historical  data for Standard  and Poor's combined 
index of 500 stocks are found on page S-21 of Survey  of Current  Business 
and in 1969 Business Statistics. Comments  and 
Discussion 
Barry  Bosworth:  This comparative  study of investment  models is to be 
commended  because it uses a common set of data and common time 
period,  and because,  unlike several  previous  studies,  it attempts  to use a 
common  statistical  technique.  It is striking  that, over the period of esti- 
mation,  the alternative  formulations  of investment  behavior  all fit  relatively 
well. Their fits are barely distinguishable  from one another, in  part 
because of the use of the autocorrelation  adjustments,  in part because 
of the great  power  of least-squares  regression  to make  things  fit. 
But,  when  we turn  to the  predictions,  a wide  range  of differences  emerges. 
It is somewhat  disappointing  that, after  a decade  of intensive  research,  we 
can achieve  so little agreement  in predicting  investment.  In view of this 
situation,  I decided  to look again  at the basic theories  of investment  and 
some of the data problems  involved. 
The simplest formulation  of investment  behavior is  the accelerator 
model. It postulates  that the capital-output  ratio, though it may change 
over  time, does not change  in response  to other  economic  variables,  such 
as relative  prices.  The  neoclassical  model  attempts  to extend  the accelerator 
model by allowing  the desired  capital stock to be affected  by relative 
prices.  In the neoclassical  theoretical  view, capital  is treated  essentially  as 
a  variable  input, and thus no differently  from labor. Capital can be 
"rented,"  as it were,  for the short  run.  Thus,  theory  ignores  the irreversible 
long-term  character  of investment-a matter  that is greatly  stressed  in the 
theory of the firm. The neoclassical  model takes a myopic view of the 
investment  decision, comparing  the current  productivity  and the rental 
cost of capital;  it thus  finesses  the standard  practice  of summing  discounted 
future  income  flows  to see whether  a project  is profitable  over  its lifetime. 
The irreversibility  is brought  in, however,  when the model is modified 
to allow for imperfections  in the resale  market  for capital.  But that leaves 
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us with two different  rules:  The discounted  present  value  of future  income 
flow indicates  whether  a given  investment  would be ultimately  profitable, 
while  the myopic  rule  indicates  whether  now is the best time to make  that 
investment.  That split of the decision  process  is not a satisfactory  solution 
and  its weakness  may  be empirically  important,  because  the two rules  may 
depart  from each other over the business  cycle. Long-term  expectations 
should  influence  investment  behavior  and  they do not necessarily  conform 
to the business  situation  of the moment  or to mechanical  moving  averages 
of the past. For example,  after  nine years  of continuous  economic  expan- 
sion, businessmen  may have concluded  in 1969 that government  policy 
would generally  keep the economy  close to potential  output. 
The real rate of interest  becomes  an odd concept in this formulation. 
It is the net combination  of a nominal  discount  rate used for the invest- 
ment  decision  and  a rate  of expected  capital  gains  (or losses)  on investment 
goods. Only  if the resale  market  is perfect,  however,  will the expectation  of 
greater  capital  gains  just offset  the influence  of an equal  rise  in the interest 
or discount  rate.  The two influences  may not be symmetric. 
I am also bothered  by the fact  that the elasticity  of substitution  is really 
the only interesting  empirical  parameter  in the neoclassical  model. The 
focus on that elasticity,  in effect,  makes  three  bold assumptions:  that firms 
have correct a priori knowledge  of all production  opportunities,  that 
alternative  methods  of production  are available,  and that firms  maximize 
profits.  The neoclassical  model  does offer  a useful  analytical  technique  for 
dealing  with a variety  of changes  in taxes and interest  rates.  But some of 
the empirical  applications  leave me uncomfortable-for example, the 
exclusion  of property  taxes. 
There  is a third approach,  which  is not well represented  by any of the 
empirical  models  Bischoff  reviews.  That  model,  which  I shall  call the flow- 
of-funds  model,  extends  the neoclassical  approach  by making  the discount 
rate a function  of the internal  financial  structure  of the firm.  The crucial 
aspect  of this model  is the balancing  of financial  stocks and  flows. Such  a 
model  has  the major  advantage  of specifying  an optimal  rate  of adjustment 
for capital  stocks  and  integrating  the theories  of production  and  valuation. 
John  Lintner  has done some  empirical  work  along  these  lines, showing  the 
influence  of debt  positions  as well  as prices  and  interest  rates  on investment. 
The Federal  Reserve-MIT-Penn  (FMP) model lies between  the neo- 
classical  andf  low-of-funds  models.  The  discount  rate  is a weighted  average 
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But it may not be a good measure  of the ex ante  cost of capital  as viewed 
by the firm;  for example,  the firm  would  view  the cost of equity  capital  as 
including  expected  capital  gains  on stocks.  The central  aspect  of the FMP 
model,  as Bischoff  emphasizes,  is the differential  lag in the responses  to out- 
put and  prices.  The putty-clay  model  would  account  for such  a differential 
lag, as Bischoff  points out. But there are many other reasons  why firms 
might react  more promptly  to rises in output  than to changes  in relative 
prices. 
Empirical  work on investment  should recognize  that investment  arises 
from many different  motives,  and that these apply  differently  in different 
industries.  Regulated  industries  like utilities  do not behave  the way manu- 
facturing  does. Commercial  construction  presents  still a different  case; 
the decision  to produce  building  space is basically  an inventory  decision 
influenced  by vacancy  rates.  Hence,  it would  be useful  to disaggregate  the 
investment  data and develop  investment  functions  by sector. 
These differences  between  sectors  seem  especially  important  in the cur- 
rent  situation.  I would  expect  that,  in the near  future,  investment  by public 
utilities  will continue  to be strong;  that  commercial  construction  will  begin 
to flatten out, declining  less rapidly  than in recent quarters;  and that 
manufacturing  investment  will continue  rather  weak until the rest of the 
economy  resumes  a substantial  upturn. 
Robert  Hall: The paper  offers  a useful  comparison  of the various  models, 
but the comparison  is not as neat and clean  as I would  have  hoped.  In the 
first place, the statistical adjustment  for autocorrelation  obscures the 
differences.  If the standard  errors  of the equations  are taken without  the 
autocorrelation  adjustment,  FMP stands  out as far superior  to its closest 
competitor,  the cash flow model. 
Even more important,  Bischoff's  equations  are substantial  generaliza- 
tions of the underlying  models.  For example,  his version  of the standard 
neoclassical  model  departs  in three  ways from  what  I would  regard  as the 
standard  neoclassical  model. First, the equation  has a constant  term  that 
theoretically  does not belong  there.  Second,  the neoclassical  equation  used 
by Jorgenson  does not sum the coefficients  on a lagged, relative  price 
variable,  but sums  the coefficients  on a change  in the relative  price  variable, 
and  constrains  the sum  of the coefficients  to be zero.  Third,  Bischoff  treats 
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neoclassical  logic requires  that the coefficient  be equal to the replacement 
rate, which is supposedly  known in advance.  These departures  from my 
notion of the neoclassical  model are generalizations  that should  improve 
the fit of the equation;  in other  words,  they  make  the standard  neoclassical 
(SNC) model look better during  the sample  period. But they may also 
explain  why the investment  projections  by that model are so implausibly 
low relative  to those of other  models. 
Something  has  to be holding  the SNC forecasts  down;  the constant  term 
is one thing  that could reduce  the accelerator  response  to changes  in out- 
put, but that can't  be the whole story.  The flatness  of the SNC projection 
remains,  in part, a mystery  to me.' 
Finally,  I want to urge caution  in interpreting  the calculated  effects  of 
changes  in tax policy. Many things,  such as interest  rates  and prices,  are 
held constant  in these calculations  and some of them  would not be likely 
to remain  constant  in fact. If price equals  full cost, including  the cost of 
capital,  and if the "rental"  price  of capital  changes  while  the price  of out- 
put and interest  rates  do not, a compensating  change  in wages  is implied. 
There  is thus a hidden  assumption  that wages  go up whenever  the cost of 
capital  goes down. In addition,  holding  constant  the market  interest  rate 
(that is, interest  before  taxes)  results  in the interest  rate after  taxes falling 
by the full proportionate  amount  of any tax increase  or rising  by the full 
amount  of a tax reduction.  In fact, one would expect  the interest  rate on 
corporate  debt  to be sensitive  to the corporate  tax rate.  Furthermore,  there 
is an assumption  that  the marginal  cost of borrowing  is fully  tax deductible 
and that is unrealistic;  at most, the average  cost is deductible,  and even 
that is not the case when equity  funds are raised.  Last, the calculations 
assume  zero shifting  of the corporate  tax, another  extreme  and unrealistic 
assumption. 
General  Discussion 
Robert  Eisner  was concerned  that  the many  critical  assumptions  in these 
models  be made clear  in examining  the implications  of tax changes,  espe- 
cially  with respect  to accelerated  depreciation.  It is not known  how depre- 
1. I have subsequently  learned  that the problem  is that the constants  in the accelerator 
and FMP equations are large and negative. Again, the logic of those models suggests 
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ciation affects  either  the relative  price of capital or the concept of cash 
flow relevant  to capital  spending  decisions.  Investment  functions  are con- 
cerned  with anticipations  of the  future,  and  the variables  from  the past and 
present  that are measurable  serve primarily  as proxies for expectations. 
There  is no particular  reason  to assume  that a given  increase  in measured 
cash flow due to accelerated  depreciation  creates  the same anticipated 
changes  as one due to a rise in profits. 
Alan Greenspan  felt that  the data  on real  investment  in structures  might 
have been  biased  downward,  particularly  in recent  years,  by the use of the 
official  price deflators,  which virtually  rule out the possibility  of produc- 
tivity gains in construction.  He noted that a more realistic  price series  is 
available,  although  only on an annual  basis. Robert  Eisner  regretted  that 
the elasticity  of substitution  had been assumed  to have a value of 1 for 
equipment  and of 0.5 for construction,  rather  than being  freely  estimated 
in this study.  He felt that the unity  value  for equipment  was considerably 
too high. Bischoff emphasized  that he had estimated  the elasticity of 
substitution  in a number  of other studies.  The estimates  of elasticity  for 
equipment  tended  to come out somewhat  above 1 when freely  estimated, 
but he had scaled  it down for this study  on a priori  grounds. 